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ENDING SCHOOL BRUTALITY

NICOLE TUCHINDA*
ABSTRACT
Children, especially Black children, are killed, traumatized, injured, and terrorized through assaults, solitary confinement, inappropriate handcuffing, and other excessive applications of physical
force upon children in public schools. The state employees enacting
such maltreatment are not just police. They are mainly teachers,
principals, and security guards, and they are given authorization by
law for purposes of “educating,” “disciplining,” and “maintaining order”
in public schools. Scientific research does not support the use of physical force to improve behavior, however. This Article describes the
problem of school brutality, the excessive, unwarranted, and traumatizing use of physical force by state employees upon students. By
traumatizing children, school brutality can cause lasting and disabling developmental and educational harm. School brutality is facilitated by multiple legal structures, including a tort law privilege rooted
in colonial times; an inconsistent patchwork of state laws permitting
seclusion, restraint, and corporal punishment; qualified immunity;
lack of regulation of police officers’ actions in schools; federal funding
for regular police presence in public schools; and lack of enforcement
and review of reporting on school brutality. Substantive due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, originally framed to protect adult criminal suspects, are inadequate for children. Unless
state employees become less shielded from civil and criminal actions
that seek to hold them accountable for school brutality, new private
rights of action are needed. State and federal legislators can save
lives and support educational achievement by ending the legalization of school brutality.
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Memphis Cecil C.
Humphreys School of Law; 2019–2020 Director and 2015–2017 Clinical Instructor of the
Juvenile and Special Education Law Clinic at the University of the District of Columbia
David A. Clarke School of Law (UDC); 2017–2019 Clinical Teaching Fellow at the Health
Justice Alliance clinic at Georgetown University Law Center (GULC); LLM, GULC,
LLM, UDC; JD, George Washington University Law School; MD, Johns Hopkins
University School of Medicine; BA, Yale College. The author’s ideas developed from her
work in advocating for special education clients. The author would like to thank Yael
Cannon, Katy Ramsey, Deborah Epstein, Phil Lee, Matthew Fraidin, Joseph Tulman,
Ronnie Gipson, Daniel Schaffzin, Kate Schaffzin, Amy Stein, William Montross, Jodi
Wilson, Margaret Hu, Colleen Chien, Margaret Woo, Natasha Varyani, Stacey Eunnae,
and Howard Pryor for their support. This Article was presented as a work in progress
at the 2021 Inaugural Workshop for Asian American Women in the Legal Academy.
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INTRODUCTION
I. THE PREVALENCE OF SCHOOL BRUTALITY AND ITS UNNECESSARY HARM
A. School Brutality and Its Unnecessary Harm
B. The Prevalence of School Brutality and Its Disproportionate
Harm upon Black Children and Children with Disabilities
II. LEGAL STRUCTURES LEGALIZING AND FACILITATING SCHOOL
BRUTALITY
A. Teacher Privilege: The Colonial Root of the Legalization
of School Brutality
B. Limitations in Constitutional Law Protections Against
School Brutality
1. Eighth Amendment Claims
2. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
3. Fourth Amendment Claims
C. State Statutes Regarding School Corporal Punishment
1. States that Ban Corporal Punishment in Schools
2. States that Permit Corporal Punishment in Schools
D. State Statutes on Seclusion and Restraint
E. State Statutes Regarding Police in Schools
F. How School Systems Are Closed to Public Scrutiny and
the Need for New Private Rights of Action
III. SOLUTIONS
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
George Floyd’s last words echoed the screams of a Black child
in a D.C. public middle school a few years ago.1 “Mama! Mama! No!
No! Mama!” she cried as the school resource officer (SRO) dragged
her by the leg down the hallway.2 Every time the child tried to get up,
the SRO dragged her farther down the hall, causing her to fall backwards onto her shoulders and back with a thud.3 Her teary eyes wide,
1. Cf. Lonnae O’Neal, George Floyd’s mother was not there, but he used her as a
sacred invocation, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (May 30, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic
.com/history/article/george-floyds-mother-not-there-he-used-her-as-sacred-invocation
[https://perma.cc/F6XM-VYCV] (explaining that George Floyd, age 46, called to his mother
multiple times before his death by police brutality).
2. Statement of Unidentified Child at Johnson Middle School, D.C. Public Schools
(Oct. 2016) [hereinafter Statement of Unidentified Child] (document on file with author).
This was one of several disturbing interactions between governmental employees in
schools and children that I witnessed while I was a Clinical Instructor and Director of the
Juvenile and Special Education Law Clinic at the University of the District of Columbia
David A. Clarke School of Law.
3. Id.
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she cried, screamed for help, and tried to twist away to no avail.4
Teachers and administrators walked past, but everyone pretended
not to hear.5 Occasionally the SRO laughed.6
Screaming, crying, twisting, laughing, and more dragging.7 The
torturous cycle continued for several minutes before the child was
released and became a shaking ball of tears.8 Clearly this was a regular interaction between governmental employees and a child in a
public school. No school staff intervened.9 No one tried to hide it
from or explain it to me, the attorney who represented parents and
children sitting just feet away in the lobby while waiting for a meeting about another child. Maybe they all guessed correctly that the
law did little to protect the child.10
This was one of the milder incidents of state agents traumatizing children at school. Brief news coverage and viral video releases
help the public to catch sight of the dangers. A thirteen-year-old boy
with autism died in Northern California after “multiple school employees kept him facedown on his stomach for nearly two hours until
he vomited and passed out.”11 When a five-year-old boy in Maryland
wandered away from school, police officers handcuffed him and told
him fifteen to twenty times that he “needed to be beaten.”12 A sixyear-old girl in Florida cried and pled “no, no” as a school principal
hit her with a wooden paddle as another woman held her down.13
News reporters called the footage “graphic,” and the girl’s mother
said that the paddling expressed “hatred.”14 A twelve-year-old girl
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Statement of Unidentified Child, supra note 2.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5-E, §§ 2401(12), 2403 (prohibiting corporal punishment in certain circumstances). D.C. regulations prohibit the corporal punishment of
public school students, but these regulations do not apply to law enforcement officers.
See id.
11. Amber Jamieson, Three School Employees Are Being Charged After A 13-Year-Old
Autistic Boy Died After Being Restrained, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 13, 2019, 11:14 AM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/amberjamieson/autistic-boy-restraint-death
-charged-manslaughter [https://perma.cc/GLE7-2ZQV].
12. Laura Wainman, Kolbie Satterfield & John Henry, ‘This is why people need to
beat their kids’: Video shows police officers handcuffing, screaming at 5-year-old boy,
WUSA9 (Mar. 27, 2021, 7:57 AM), https://www.wusa9.com/article/news/local/maryland
/body-camera-police-footage-5-year-old-boy/65-48579fa7-8422-48b4-8f6f-f5361721879a
[https://perma.cc/J233-JFWB].
13. Justin Vallejo, Florida teacher caught on camera hitting 6-year-old girl with
paddle, INDEP. (May 4, 2021, 7:52 AM), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ameri
cas/florida-school-child-paddle-video-b1841413.html.
14. Id.
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was thrown face-first onto the ground by a police officer at a school
in Texas.15 Over three years, a child was secluded or restrained 437
times in Virginia.16
When people talk about school safety, they usually discuss mass
shootings at school, which are relatively rare,17 and drugs and weapons brought onto campus by children.18 They are not usually envisioning more than 222,000 incidents per year of corporal punishment,
seclusion, restraint, and other acts of brutality committed by the
adults hired to protect and support schoolchildren.19 State employees
regularly injure, traumatize, terrorize, and kill children through
school brutality, which includes shootings,20 assaults, solitary confinement, inappropriate handcuffing, and other excessive applications
of physical force in public schools.21 The state agents enacting such
maltreatment are not just police, however. They are mainly teachers, principals, and security guards, and they are given authorization by law for purposes of “punishing,” “educating,” “controlling,”
“disciplining,” and “maintaining order” in public schools.22 The use of
physical force to improve child behavior, however, is not supported
15. Sebastian Murdock, Video Shows Texas Cop Body Slam Middle School Girl,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/california-cop-slams
-girl_n_57057e4ee4b0b90ac271278d.
16. Jenny Abamu & Rob Manning, Desperation And Broken Trust When Schools
Restrain Students Or Lock Them In Rooms, NPR (June 5, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www
.npr.org/2019/06/05/726519409/desperation-and-broken-trust-when-schools-restrain-stu
dents-or-lock-them-in-room [https://perma.cc/8L4N-7DSA].
17. Cf. Sergio Peçanha, Lockdown drills: An American quirk, out of control, WASH.
POST (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/10/11/lockdown
-drills-an-american-quirk-out-control [https://perma.cc/N2QF-FFVQ]. On average, three
children and one adult die per year from school shootings. Id.
18. See, e.g., Kirk A. Bailey & Catherine J. Ross, School Safety & Youth Violence: A
Legal Primer, HAMILTON FISH INST., at ii.
19. See Corey Mitchell, Schools Underreport How Often Students Are Restrained or
Secluded, GAO Finds, EDUC. WEEK (June 18, 2019), https://www.edweek.org/leadership
/schools-underreport-how-often-students-are-restrained-or-secluded-gao-finds/2019/06
[https://perma.cc/3QZQ-C469]; see also Mark Keierleber, Kids Keep Getting Hit at School,
Even Where Corporal Punishment is Banned, THE 74 (May 19, 2021), https://www.the74
million.org/article/kids-keep-getting-hit-at-school-even-where-corporal-punishment-is
-banned [https://perma.cc/P4SL-9G85].
20. See Mark Keierleber, The California School Safety Officer Accused of Murder
Wasn’t a Cop. Does that Actually Matter?, THE 74 (Nov. 9, 2021), https://www.the74mil
lion.org/article/the-california-school-safety-officer-accused-of-murder-wasnt-a-cop-does
-that-actually-matter [https://perma.cc/9E4B-7ZAT] (describing when a school security
officer shot an 18-year-old girl as she fled in the passenger seat of a car near the high
school where he worked; the girl had been in a fight with a 15-year-old student of the
school; the 18-year-old died shortly after).
21. Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Sarah A. Font, Corporal Punishment in U.S. Public
Schools: Prevalence, Disparities in Use, and Status in State and Federal Policy, SOC.
POL’Y RPT., 2016, at 2.
22. Cf. id.
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by research. Rather, scientific research consistently shows that applying physical force to children worsens behavior and educational
achievement and harms children mentally and physically.23
In particular, research since the late 1990s reveals that twothirds of Americans have experienced a potentially traumatic event
or series of events during childhood, called an adverse childhood
experience (ACE).24 Hundreds of studies show that the more adversity, or ACEs, that a child experiences, the more likely the child is
to have impairments in health, learning, and behavior.25 When an
adversity causes long-term harm, it is trauma.26 Trauma can so significantly impact development and health that it can create and
exacerbate disabilities that impede learning and behavior, promote
academic failure and incarceration, and cause disease and even early
death.27 Childhood trauma is so harmful and prevalent that “many
experts consider [it] to be the most important public health crisis of
our time.”28
Currently, “the vast majority of public schools do not provide
the support that children [who have experienced] trauma need to
succeed.”29 In particular, most schools “operate on the traditional
assumption that student functioning is not impaired by trauma.
Consequently, student misbehavior is commonly misinterpreted as
premeditated or intentional [action] rather than [impulsivity or]
unthinking, fight-or-flight responses [that resulted from] trauma.”30
Such interpretation fuels the desire by educators to punish misbehaving students with moral condemnation and violence.
The use of physical force to discipline schoolchildren, however,
is itself an adversity that adds to children’s traumas, thereby worsening the challenges that cause much of the misbehavior at school.31
23. See discussion, infra Section I.A; cf. Nicole Tuchinda, The Imperative for TraumaResponsive Special Education, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 706, 772, 787–93 (2020).
24. See id. at 770, 787 (explaining that Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) were
originally defined as childhood emotional, sexual, or physical abuse; physical or emotional
neglect; substance abuse by a household member; mental illness in a household member;
violence directed at one’s mother, parental divorce, or separation; or incarceration of a
member of the household).
25. Id. at 786–94.
26. Id. at 794.
27. Id. at 770–71.
28. Id. at 771.
29. Tuchinda, supra note 23, at 773.
30. Id. at 772.
31. Cf. Peter F. Cronholm, Christine M. Forke, Roy Wade, Megan H. Bair-Merritt,
Martha Davis, Mary Harkins-Schwarz, Lee M. Pachter & Joel A. Fein, Adverse Childhood Experiences: Expanding the Concept of Adversity, 49 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED.
354, 358 (2015) (providing evidence to support the addition of witnessing violence, feeling
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Accordingly, a major reason to end school brutality is that the new
research on trauma underscores how such brutality will cause the
opposite effects—worse behavior, worse health and disability, and
worse educational outcomes—of what schools and policymakers desire.32 Children need schools to be a place where they can recover
from traumas, rather than be subjected to more of them.33
It is time to call school corporal punishment, seclusion, restraint,
and other violence upon children by a name—school brutality—that
captures the traumatic and unreasonable nature of these practices
and centers the needs of children, rather than adults. School brutality
often occurs when adults are acting aggressively or without control.34 Such brutality destroys trust and connection, promotes academic failure and the development of mental illness, and increases
the likelihood that children will become incarcerated.35 School brutality also plays a significant role in subjugating the most vulnerable
children, including children with disabilities, Black children, and
children in poverty.36 The public is occasionally alarmed by stories
and images of school brutality, yet such brutality persists.37 By more
accurately naming traumatic practices by state agents at schools,
this Article seeks to end desensitization to the problem.
Similar to police brutality, school brutality is the excessive and
unwarranted use of force by state officials upon ordinary citizens.38
Both forms of brutality inflict injury, terror, trauma, and death.39
discrimination, and unsafe neighborhood to the Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs)
scale); David Finkelhor, Anne Shattuck, Heather Turner & Sherry Hamby, A Revised
Inventory of Adverse Childhood Experiences, 48 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 13, 16, 19 (2015)
(providing evidence supporting the addition of community violence exposure to the ACEs
scale).
32. Tuchinda, supra note 23, at 787–93, 801–02.
33. See, e.g., Stephen Sawchuk, More School Districts Sever Ties With Police. Will
Others Follow?, EDUC. WEEK (June 26, 2020), https://www.edweek.org/leadership/more
-school-districts-sever-ties-with-police-will-others-follow/2020/06 [https://perma.cc/6VWD
-6Z7D] (“Our schools become a sanctuary because of the violence in their communities.
We have communities under siege by gun violence,” said Dwayne Truss, a member of the
Los Angeles school board.).
34. Abamu & Manning, supra note 16.
35. See Tuchinda, supra note 23, at 787–93, 801.
36. See infra Section I.B.
37. See, e.g., Meredith Deliso & Sabina Ghebremedhin, Florida teen body-slammed
by school resource officer ‘traumatized,’ family says, ABC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2021, 5:08 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/florida-teen-body-slammed-school-resource-officer-trauma
tized/story?id=75582344 [https://perma.cc/6LHQ-YAFU].
38. Cf. THE L. DICTIONARY, What Is Police Brutality?, https://thelawdictionary.org
/article/what-is-police-brutality [https://perma.cc/JL6T-HWER] (last visited Apr. 7, 2022)
(defining police brutality “as the use of excessive and/or unnecessary force by police when
dealing with civilians.” The umbrella term includes excessive use of force, false arrest
or wrongful imprisonment, racial discrimination, and sexual harassment and abuse.).
39. See id.
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Unlike police brutality, however, almost all of the victims of school
brutality are children, and the state actors are mainly teachers,
principals, other school administrators, and security guards, although
police commit some of the worst offenses.40
This Article highlights what the school-to-prison pipeline lens
does not focus upon. The school-to-prison pipeline describes the collection of education and public safety policies and practices, including
suspension and expulsion, that push primarily children of color and
children with disabilities out of the classroom and into the streets,
the juvenile system, or the criminal law system.41 Much literature
appropriately describes the pipeline and proposes to dismantle it.42
However, descriptions of the school-to-prison pipeline do not focus
upon the physical maltreatment of children in public schools, a phenomenon that causes significant harm, helps to send children to
prison, and requires attention and change.43
Parents have sought criminal and civil liability for school brutality, but they have rarely succeeded because state and federal law
have never adequately protected children from school brutality.44
Consequently, children have very little right to protection from state
violence in public schools, even in states with statutes that prohibit
corporal punishment and regulate seclusion and restraint.45 Layers
of legal structures protect adult governmental employees, rather than
children, from violence and liability.46 These layers include continued case law support for the outdated tort privilege enabling teachers to physically punish children;47 a patchwork of inconsistent and
40. See Clare Lombardo & Jenny Abamu, A Dreaded Part of Teachers’ Jobs: Restraining and Secluding Students, NPR (Dec. 5, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org
/2019/12/05/777358918/a-dreaded-part-of-teachers-jobs-restraining-and-secluding-stu
dents [https://perma.cc/Y49J-V6FT] (including experiences of teachers’ assistants, English
second language teachers, special education teachers, and a dean at a charter school and
including that one teacher sometimes received calls from “administrators and other
teachers . . . to use these methods not as a last resort, but as a way to gain control of
chaotic situations.”).
41. See School-to-Prison-Pipeline, DISABILITY RTS. EDUC. & DEF. FUND, https://dredf
.org/legal-advocacy/school-to-prison-pipeline/#:~:text=The%20School-to-Prison%20Pipe
line%20%28STPP%29%20refers%20to%20the%20practice,greatest%20risk%20of%20
being%20thrust%20into%20the%20STPP [https://perma.cc/C78N-A6PF].
42. See, e.g., CATHERINE Y. KIM, DANIEL J. LOSEN & DAMON T. HEWITT, THE SCHOOLTO-PRISON PIPELINE 112–13 (2010).
43. Matt Barnum, Do police keep schools safe? Fuel the school-to-prison pipeline?
Here’s what the research says., CHALKBEAT (June 23, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.chalk
beat.org/2020/6/23/21299743/police-schools-research [https://perma.cc/FA7D-79KB].
44. See infra Part II.
45. See infra Section II.C.1.
46. See infra Part II.
47. See infra Section II.A.
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gap-filled state statutes regarding corporal punishment, seclusion,
and restraint;48 statutory exclusions of school brutality from child
abuse definitions;49 a lack of statutory law limiting police action in
schools;50 inaccurate and incomplete reporting on school brutality
incidents;51 qualified immunity and statutory indemnification for
school corporal punishment;52 and weak constitutional protections.53
Legal literature on topics relating to school brutality do not analyze corporal punishment and seclusion and restraint laws together,
and they usually focus exclusively on constitutional law theories for
remedying state violence upon children at school.54 Articles on corporal punishment, for instance, have made arguments about how school
corporal punishment violates international law or why the U.S. Supreme Court should overturn Ingraham v. Wright,55 the decision that
generally authorizes states to corporally punish children in schools.56
This is the first law review article to define school brutality and
describe the significance of its traumatic nature. This Article emphasizes that any law that permits the use of any form of physical force
upon students opens the door to physical abuse upon schoolchildren.
48. See infra Section II.D.
49. See infra Section II.C.2.
50. See infra Section II.E.
51. See infra Section II.F.
52. See infra Section II.C.2.
53. See infra Section II.B.
54. See, e.g., Craig Goodmark, A Tragic Void: Georgia’s Failure to Regulate Restraint
and Seclusion in Schools, 3 JOHN MARSHALL L.J. 249, 253–54, 257–59 (2010) (analyzing
seclusion and restraint laws, but not corporal punishment laws); Jessica Butler, How
Safe Is the Schoolhouse?: An Analysis of State Seclusion and Restraint Laws and Policies,
AUTISM NAT’L COMM., https://www.autcom.org/pdf/HowSafeSchoolhouse.pdf [https://
perma.cc/XYL3-2H3C] (analyzing seclusion and restraint laws, but not corporal punishment laws); Nicole Mortorano, Note, Protecting Children’s Rights Inside of the Schoolhouse
Gates: Ending Corporal Punishment in Schools, 102 GEO. L.J. 481, 483–84 (2014) (analyzing corporal punishment laws, but not seclusion and restraint laws); Daniel Stewart,
How Do the States Regulate Restraint and Seclusion in Public Schools? A Survey of the
Strengths and Weaknesses in State Laws, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 531, 533–34 (2011) (neglecting to analyze corporal punishment laws); Lanette Suarez, Comment, Restraint,
Seclusion, and the Disabled Student: The Blurred Lines Between Safety and Physical
Punishment, 71 UNIV. MIAMI L. REV. 859, 867, 872–73 (2017) (neglecting to analyze corporal punishment laws).
55. See, e.g., Susan Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Human Rights: International
Law’s Mandate Against All Corporal Punishment of Children, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 147,
153–54 (1999); SUSAN BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN: A HUM. RTS.
VIOLATION 47 (2006); Mortorano, supra note 54, at 497–98 (making strong arguments for
why the U.S. Supreme Court should overturn Ingraham v. Wright regarding school
corporal punishment).
56. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 683 (1977) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to school corporal punishment, and such punishment does not
violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of state commonlaw constraints and remedies).
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Thus, a state’s strict regulation of seclusion and restraint, for instance,
is undermined by insufficient regulation of corporal punishment.
This is the first article to challenge the U.S. Supreme Court’s
assumptions in Ingraham v. Wright that schools are adequately open
to public scrutiny, and common law tort and criminal remedies are
sufficient to meet due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.57 Significant data show that schools often hide school brutality,
and common law tort and criminal remedies are regularly unavailing to child victims and their parents due to qualified immunity and
statutory indemnification for corporal punishment at school;58 ambivalent regulation of school corporal punishment, seclusion, and restraint;59 the undue influence of the tort privilege for teachers;60 and
other legal structures.61 Unless state employees become less shielded
from civil and criminal actions that seek to hold them accountable
for school brutality, new private rights of action are needed to enforce prohibitions on such brutality.
This is the first article to discuss the need for reform in multiple
areas of law beyond constitutional law—including state tort, criminal,
and child abuse law—to prevent school brutality. Part I of this Article
provides an overview of the prevalence of school brutality and its
unnecessary harm. Part II describes the legal structures that facilitate
school brutality. Part II includes a survey of state statutory and regulatory law regarding corporal punishment, seclusion, restraint, and
police action in schools. Part III proposes solutions to school brutality.
I. THE PREVALENCE OF SCHOOL BRUTALITY AND
ITS UNNECESSARY HARM
A. School Brutality and Its Unnecessary Harm
School brutality is the excessive, unwarranted, and traumatizing
use of physical force by governmental employees upon students.62 It
typically involves the use of force to solitarily confine, immobilize, or
inflict pain on a student as a means of discipline or control.63 Examples of the intentional infliction of physical pain by educators, security
57. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 678 (“[T]he available civil and criminal sanctions for
abuse—considered in light of the openness of the school environment—afford significant
protection against unjustified corporal punishment.”).
58. See infra Section II.C.2.
59. See infra Section II.D.
60. See infra Section II.A.
61. See infra Part II.
62. Cf. THE L. DICTIONARY, supra note 38.
63. See, e.g., Mortorano, supra note 54, at 482.
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guards, and police officers include hitting, shoving, punching, grabbing, stuffing into bags,64 applying tasers upon,65 and handcuffing.66
School brutality includes corporal punishment, which is typically
defined as the intentional hitting or paddling or other use of force to
inflict physical pain on students for purposes of discipline or control.67 School brutality includes seclusion, which is the involuntary
confinement of a student alone in a room or area from which the student is physically prevented from leaving.68 It also includes restraint,
which, as defined by the U.S. Department of Education, is “a personal restriction that immobilizes or reduces the ability of a student
to move his or her torso, arms, legs, or head freely.”69
64. See, e.g., Brian Ross, Deadly Discipline? Students Hurt, Dying After Being Restrained, ABC NEWS (Nov. 29. 2012), https://abcnews.go.com/video/amp/embed?id=178437
67&storyId=18892197&storyHeadline=New%20Law%20Targets%20Padded%20Rooms%
20for%20Autistic%20Kids&contentType=story&placement=featured [https://perma.cc/6442
-J3PV] (showing a duffel bag that educators use to stuff children into during restraint).
65. Luke Darby, Florida Police Officer Arrested and Handcuffed a 6-Year-Old Black
Girl for a Tantrum in Class, GQ (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.gq.com/story/six-year-old
-black-girl-arrested-for-a-tantrum [https://perma.cc/VTJ6-XNM2] (explaining that in 2016,
the Huffington Post found nearly 90 cases of school resource officers using tasers on
students between 12 and 19 years old).
66. See id.
67. See Lynn Roy, Corporal Punishment in American Public Schools and the Rights
of the Child, 30 J. L. & EDUC. 554, 555 (2001) (defining corporal punishment as “the willful
and deliberate infliction of physical pain on the person of another to modify undesirable
behavior”). The United Nations defines corporal punishment as
any punishment in which physical force is used and intended to cause some
degree of pain or discomfort, however light. Most involves hitting (‘smacking’,
‘slapping’, ‘spanking’) children, with the hand or with an implement—a whip,
stick, belt, shoe, wooden spoon, etc. But it can also involve, for example, kicking, shaking or throwing children, scratching, pinching, biting, pulling hair
or boxing ears, forcing children to stay in uncomfortable positions, burning,
scalding or forced ingestion.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 8 Nov. 20, 1989, 4 U.N.T.S.
11; see also NAT’L ASSOC. SCH. PSYCH., Position Statement Corporal Punishment, https://
webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:bZ2zvA1XyYIJ:https://www.nasponline
.org/x26815.xml+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us [https://perma.cc/7NRS-EQ7K] (last visited
Apr. 7, 2022) (defining corporal punishment as “the intentional infliction of pain or discomfort or the use of physical force upon a student with the intention of causing the student
to experience bodily pain to punish the student’s behavior”). Compare 22 PA. CODE
§ 12.16 (defining corporal punishment as “[a] form of physical discipline that is intended
to cause pain and fear and in which a student is spanked, paddled or hit on any part of the
body with a hand or instrument”), with 2 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 37.0011(a) (defining corporal
punishment as the “deliberate infliction of physical pain by hitting, paddling, spanking,
slapping, or any other physical force used as a means of discipline,” but excludes restraint).
68. U.S. DEP’T EDUC., RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION: RES. DOCUMENT 10 (May 2012),
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/seclusion/restraints-and-seclusion-resources.pdf [https://perma
.cc/7TR9-24T4] (defining seclusion and differentiating it from timeout, supervised inschool detentions, and out-of-school suspensions, which do not involve physically locking
a child in an area).
69. Id. (explaining that restraint includes mechanical restraint, which is the use of any
device or equipment, such as handcuffs, to restrict a student’s freedom of movement).
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Corporal punishment in American schools has involved a wide
range of actions and injuries.70 To illustrate, in 2016, in Alabama,
an assistant principal paddled a twelve-year-old child twice because
he was seen licking his fingers, which a teacher misinterpreted as
an obscene gesture.71
The paddling caused the child to cry in pain during and after
the paddling, and an examination revealed dark bruises.72 Afterwards, the child was afraid to go to school, and “his grades slipped
from A’s and B’s to D’s and F’s.”73 He was “subsequently diagnosed
with PTSD, anxiety, and depression as a result of child abuse.”74 He
was treated with medication for these conditions.75
In another case in Georgia in 2016, a paraprofessional aide picked
up and hung an elementary school student on a classroom chalkboard
by his belt loop while other children laughed, causing him physical
and mental pain.76 In Arkansas, a school coach dragged a thirteenyear-old student across the floor for fifteen feet and then banged his
head against a metal pole.77 Corporal punishment, even when it involves a single blow by a paddle, often leads to injuries that may require medical attention.78 Corporal punishment is also not reserved
for the worst rule violations; students have been paddled for minor
infractions, such as being late to class and dress code violations.79
Seclusion and restraint are similarly inherently dangerous, resulting in injuries of children and adults, and deaths of children every
year.80 A 2009 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office
documented hundreds of cases of abuse and death resulting from
school restraint and seclusion.81 Security guards have kicked and
70. See, e.g., Abamu & Manning, supra note 16.
71. Wells v. Ayers, 292 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1268–69 (N.D. Ala. 2017).
72. Id. at 1269.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Davis v. Thomas, No. 1:20-cv-01062, 2021 WL 673418, at *2–3 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 22,
2021).
77. London v. Dir. of Dewitt Pub. Sch., 194 F.3d 873, 875 (8th Cir. 1999); see also
Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 2000) (describing how a
teacher struck a high school freshman with a metal weight lock, blinding him in one eye).
78. See, e.g., Derrick Johnson, The Striking Outlier: The Persistent, Painful and Problematic Practice of Corporal Punishment in Schools, S. POVERTY L. CTR. & UCLA CTR.
CIV. RTS. REMEDIES, June 11, 2019, at 12, https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files
/com_corporal_punishment_final_web_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VS3S-PG9L] (describing
bruises from school paddling that required medical attention).
79. Id.
80. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., ISSUE BRIEF #1: PROMOTING
ALTERNATIVES TO THE USE OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT 1 (2010) [hereinafter ISSUE
BRIEF #1], https://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/topics/trauma_and_violence/seclu
sion-restraints-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX7D-FHD5].
81. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-719T, SECLUSIONS AND RESTRAINTS:
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punched children while walking them to seclusion rooms.82 Children
have died by suicide by hanging in seclusion rooms.83 They have
defecated and urinated on themselves.84 They have also scratched
windows, torn at and banged their heads on walls, and begged and
screamed to be let out of seclusion.85 Injuries, including head injuries,
broken bones, pulled hair, scratches, and bruises, are common.86
Regarding conditions of seclusion, school staff have locked children in closets and confined them in dark rooms.87 Children have
endured excessive numbers of hours—such as twenty-seven hours—
inside seclusion rooms, missing class time.88 An investigation revealed
seclusion of a girl in North Dakota for half a year.89 Similarly, schools
have secluded children excessive numbers of times: a New York public school put a child in a room “seventy-five times over a six month
period” for “whistling, slouching, and hand waving.”90
Regarding restraint, school staff killed a seven-year-old after
holding the child face down for hours, and a teacher tied five-yearold children to chairs with bungee cords and duct tape.91 Schools have
pinned students to the floor for hours at a time, handcuffed them, and
placed them in strangleholds.92 Children have suffered from broken
arms; bloody noses; punches to the face; vomiting; and loss of consciousness during restraint.93 Restraints are typically assaults, involving being forced to the ground, and they often involve being
SELECTED CASES OF DEATH AND ABUSE AT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND TREATMENT
CENTERS (2009) [hereinafter SECLUSIONS & RESTRAINTS].
82. See, e.g., Carestio v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 866 So. 2d 754, 756 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004) (describing how three security guards kicked and punched Marc Carestio, a
minor, while they escorted him out of class for disruptive behavior).
83. See SECLUSIONS & RESTRAINTS, supra note 81, at 5 (describing a thirteen-year-old
who hanged himself in a seclusion room after prolonged confinement).
84. See Abamu & Manning, supra note 16 (describing how a nonverbal child with
autism defecated and urinated on himself in a desperate attempt to get out of the seclusion room).
85. Jennifer Smith Richards, Jodi S. Cohen & Lakeidra Chavis, The Quiet Rooms,
PROPUBLICA ILL. (Nov. 19, 2019), https://features.propublica.org/illinois-seclusion-rooms
/school-students-put-in-isolated-timeouts [https://perma.cc/J74P-5WWK].
86. See DISABILITY RTS. D.C., Restraint, Seclusion, and Abuse in District of Columbia
Schools and the Need for Accountability, March 2017, at 4, http://www.uls-dc.org/media
/1185/2019-seclusion-restraint-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5UY-F5DN] (describing a
head injury caused by a restraint in a Washington, D.C. school).
87. SECLUSIONS & RESTRAINTS, supra note 81, at 2, 6.
88. Id.
89. Butler, supra note 54.
90. SECLUSIONS & RESTRAINTS, supra note 81, at 13.
91. See id. at 6.
92. Id. at 1–2, 6.
93. See, e.g., id. at 6; DISABILITY RTS. D.C., supra note 86, at 4 (describing when a
seventeen-year-old child was punched and lost consciousness during a restraint).
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dragged by a wrist or other body part.94 Although restraints that block
air to the lungs can cause death, educators are often not trained on
how to safely restrain or seclude a child, and educators often remain
employed at schools even after a restraint or seclusion results in a
criminal conviction, a finding of civil or administrative liability, or
a large financial settlement.95
School brutality by law enforcement officers and former law
enforcement officers is especially violent, including shootings, kicking,
hitting, body-throwing, body-slamming, and inappropriate handcuffing.96 As described in Section II.C, although many states outlaw the
use of mechanical restraints by school staff,97 law enforcement officers
regularly use handcuffs, a form of mechanical restraint, upon children who are generally considered too young to be arrested.98 In
addition, in 2016, the Huffington Post found nearly ninety cases of
school resource officers (SROs) using tasers on students between
twelve and nineteen years old for offenses such as mouthing off to
a police officer and running from the principal’s office.99 At least
“17% of public schools equipped their security personnel with tasers
or stun guns in 2010,” even though such weapons can seriously
injure or kill children.100
School safety experts have observed that the “hierarchical,
command-and-control nature of policing can [clash] with the culture
of schools, which is supposed [to] be nurturing.”101 As Harold Jordan,
the nationwide equity coordinator at the American Civil Liberties
Union of Pennsylvania says, the presence of law enforcement officers at schools “creates an inherently threatening environment. It
94. See, e.g., Abamu & Manning, supra note 16 (“They shoved me to the ground. They
grabbed my wrist, and they dragged me up the hill by my wrist.”).
95. SECLUSIONS & RESTRAINTS, supra note 81.
96. See Rebecca Klein, Set to Stun, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 11, 2016, 9:01 AM), https://
data.huffingtonpost.com/2016/school-police/tasers [https://perma.cc/KUE6-6GFX] (describing multiple incidents of police brutality upon students); Keierleber, supra note 20.
97. See U.S. DEP’T EDUC., supra note 68, at 10. Mechanical restraint is the use of any
device or material attached to or adjacent to a student’s body that is intended to restrict
the normal freedom of movement, and which cannot easily be removed by a student. Id.
98. See, e.g., Wainman, Satterfield & Henry, supra note 12; John Donovan, How Young
Is Too Young to Be Arrested?, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Sept. 24, 2019), https://people.howstuff
works.com/too-young-to-be-arrested.htm [https://perma.cc/ELE6-NM85] (explaining that
most of the eighteen jurisdictions that place a minimum age limit on criminal liability
have determined that a child less than 10 years old cannot be charged with a crime. The
Orlando Police Department fired an officer who arrested two six-year-old children on
misdemeanor battery charges in 2019).
99. Klein, supra note 96 (describing multiple incidents of police brutality upon
students).
100. Id.
101. See Sawchuk, supra note 33.
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sends the message that the kids are the problem there and it increases the expectation that something may go wrong in a school.”102
All forms of school seclusion and corporal punishment constitute school brutality.103 The reason is that seclusion and corporal
punishment are never necessary to educate a child or manage a child’s
behavior, and such techniques have an unacceptably high risk of
physically harming and traumatizing the child.104 Seclusion and
corporal punishment are never necessary because many effective,
noncoercive behavior management and teaching strategies exist,
including positive behavioral interventions and supports (PBIS),
trauma-responsive care, mindfulness practice, restorative justice,
social-emotional learning, and Ukeru.105
Similarly, all forms of school restraint constitute school brutality except restraint that is necessary to prevent imminent, serious
physical harm to self or others.106 The restraint of a student in an
102. Keierleber, supra note 20.
103. Cf. THE L. DICTIONARY, supra note 38.
104. See Johnson, supra note 78 (“corporal punishment in schools is traumatic and not
educationally necessary”).
105. Robert H. Horner, George Sugai & Cynthia M. Anderson, Examining the Evidence
Base for School-Wide Positive Behavior Support, 42 FOCUS ON EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 1
(Apr. 2010) (providing an overview of the “rigorous and voluminous body of scholarship”
establishing positive behavioral supports and interventions as an “evidence-based practice . . . to decrease problem behavior and promote prosocial behavior”); Tuchinda, supra
note 23, at 766 (describing the evidentiary justification for trauma-responsive education,
especially for children with behavioral challenges); Trevor Fronius, Sean DarlingHammond, Hannah Persson, Sarah Guckenburg, Nancy Hurley & Anthony Petrosino,
Restorative Justice in U.S. Schools: An Updated Research Review, WESTED JUST. &
PREVENTION RSCH. CTR., Mar. 2019, at 24, https://www.wested.org/wp-content/uploads
/2019/04/resource-restorative-justice-in-u-s-schools-an-updated-research-review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3WDM-9JK9] (explaining that most of the empirical studies reviewed
reported a decrease in harmful behavior after implementation of a restorative justice
program); UKERU SYSTEMS, Our History, https://www.ukerusystems.com/who-we-are/our
-history [https://perma.cc/73WM-NXUX] (last visited Apr. 7, 2022) (describing how a behavioral healthcare organization called Grafton ended the use of seclusion and reduced
the use of restraint by over 99 percent through a cutting edge, trauma-informed approach
called Ukeru); see, e.g., Vernon A. Barnes, Lynnette B. Bauza & Frank A. Treiber, Impact
of stress reduction on negative school behavior in adolescents, 1 HEALTH & QUALITY OF
LIFE OUTCOMES 1, 1 (2003) (explaining how a transcendental meditation program at school
decreased absenteeism, rule infractions, and suspension rates); Dorothy L. Espelage,
Sabina Low, Joshua R. Polanin & Eric C. Brown, The Impact of a Middle School Program
to Reduce Aggression, Victimization, and Sexual Violence, 53 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH
180, 180 (2013) (explaining that a curriculum focused on social emotional learning skills
led to significant reductions in physical aggression by students); DIGNITY IN SCH., Counselors Not Cops: Ending the Regular Presence of Law Enforcement in Schools, 2016, at
3–5, https://dignityinschools.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/DSC_Counselors_Not_Cops
_Recommendations-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZD3K-2VGN] (providing a list of positive
approaches to school climate and discipline).
106. See Jeffrey P. Miller, Physical Education: Amending the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act to Restrict Restraint and Seclusion in Public and Private Schools,
49 FAM. CT. REV. 400, 404 (2011).
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emergency situation in which the student’s behavior poses an imminent danger of serious, physical harm upon their self or others is
reasonable. In all other circumstances, however, restraint is never
necessary to educate or discipline a student because, as mentioned
earlier, safer, effective, and noncoercive behavior management and
teaching strategies exist.107
By permitting the use of any force against a child without welldefined, enforced limitations, state laws permitting corporal punishment, seclusion, or restraint upon schoolchildren opens the door to
innumerable kinds of physical abuses of these children. The U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) defines physical
abuse as “the use of physical force, such as hitting, . . . or other shows
of force against a child.”108 Child maltreatment includes any abuse
of a child by a person in a custodial role “that results in harm, potential for harm, or threat of harm to a child.”109 Because any law that
allows corporal punishment, seclusion, or restraint upon a child permits the use of physical force against a child, such law is authorizing
child abuse according to current standards.110 Further, such law,
without well-defined, enforced limitations, also authorizes other abusive behaviors, which helps to explain how schoolchildren continue
to be tasered, closeted, duct-taped, and body-slammed at school.
Lawmakers across the country have tended to regulate corporal
punishment, seclusion, and restraint separately, as if they were distinctly different practices.111 However, when these practices are used
as punishment to control or “correct” a child, little justifies treating
them differently.112 The reason, as federal courts have concluded, is
that at essence, these practices are merely different forms of corporal punishment.113
107. See id. at 404 (asserting that restraint should be limited to those students who
pose an imminent danger to a person’s safety); Stewart, supra note 54, at 539 (asserting
that restraint and seclusion should only be used in schools to prevent harm to a person and
never for punishment, discipline, or a substitute for lack of staffing, planning, or services).
108. Beverly L. Fortson, Joanne Klevens, Melissa T. Merrick, Leah K. Gilbert & Sandra
P. Alexander, Preventing Child Abuse and Neglect: A Technical Package for Policy, Norm,
and Programmatic Activities, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 8 (2016), https://
www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/can-prevention-technical-package.pdf [https://perma
.cc/8NJX-467P].
109. Id.
110. But see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 663 (1977) (concluding that there is
contemporary approval of reasonable corporal punishment of schoolchildren).
111. See, e.g., SECLUSIONS & RESTRAINTS, supra note 81, at 33, 40, 45–46, 48–49, 51, 55.
112. See, e.g., id. at 6.
113. See, e.g., T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cnty., 610 F.3d 588, 598–99
(11th Cir. 2010) (regarding the Fourteenth Amendment, analyzing a restraint as a type
of corporal punishment); A.T. ex rel. L.T. v. Baldo, 798 Fed. App’x. 80, 83 (9th Cir. 2019)

632

WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.

[Vol. 28:617

Their central, shared quality is the use of physical force to inflict physical and emotional pain and fear in hopes that the child’s
behavior will change, to express frustration or moral condemnation
about the child or the child’s behavior, and/or to exclude the child
from an educational environment.114 The hopes that corporal punishment will improve a child’s behavior are no longer reasonable,
however, based upon decades of scientific research. Further, applying
physical force upon a child to express frustration or moral condemnation or to exclude a child is inappropriate in an educational setting
when non-abusive alternatives exist.
All forms of school brutality are coercive, demeaning, and dangerous, and they cause physical and psychological trauma to their
victims, student witnesses, and the people who commit them.115 Children typically experience school brutality as violative, frightening,
and overwhelming.116 Amplifying these reactions is the fact that
school brutality often occurs when an adult has lost their temper
and is acting recklessly, aggressively, in a fight-flight response, or
without self-control.117 School brutality violates the trust that a child
ideally has in the adults who work at school; such trust ideally involves the belief that the adults will protect and care for the child
and support the child’s best interest.
School brutality also involves the unconsented touching or
threat of such touching by a state agent upon the body of a child.118
(regarding the Fourth Amendment, analyzing the use of restraints and seclusion as
corporal punishment).
114. Cf. T.W. ex rel. Wilson, 610 F.3d at 598–99; A.T. ex rel. L.T., 798 Fed. App’x. at 83.
115. See Cronholm et al., supra note 31, at 358 (providing evidence to support the
addition of witnessing violence to the Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) scale, which
gauges exposures to potentially traumatic events); RESMAA MENAKEM, MY GRANDMOTHER’S
HANDS 47 (2017) (asserting that inflicting harm upon another human causes secondary
trauma, resulting in profound shame called “moral injury”); see Lombardo & Abamu,
supra note 40 (“parents with children who have been secluded or restrained have said
the experience was traumatic,” and teachers say that seclusion and restraint can be
physically and mentally painful for both them and their students); see Abamu & Manning,
supra note 16 (describing how repeated seclusions traumatized a child with autism,
“causing him to hate school and making him more violent and distrusting of authority
figures”; “educators acknowledge that even well-performed restraints can have a traumatizing effect on students”); SECLUSIONS & RESTRAINTS, supra note 81 (“Even if no physical
injury is sustained, . . . individuals can be severely traumatized during restraint.”).
116. See, e.g., Melinda D. Anderson, Where Teachers Are Still Allowed to Spank
Students, ATLANTIC (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015
/12/corporal-punishment/420420 [https://perma.cc/H2DT-U8XA] (reporting that 30 years
later, the memory of the paddling of a 10-year-old, which caused the child to scream, still
haunts the witness).
117. See id. (describing the “arbitrary,” “inconsistent,” and “petty” ways in which children
were corporally punished in school); MENAKEM, supra note 115, at 121–22, 128 (describing
how police brutality often occurs when the officer is in fight, flee, or freeze response).
118. See COUNCIL EUR. COMM’R HUM. RTS., Children and Corporal Punishment: “The

2022]

ENDING SCHOOL BRUTALITY

633

The pain and unconsented touching of school brutality violate the
physical integrity of the student, demonstrate disrespect for the human dignity of the student, humiliate the student, and undermine
the student’s self-esteem.119 Further, force or the threat of force to
obtain obedience or compliance from a child teaches the child to
solve problems and interact with others with violence and threats.120
School brutality, in whatever form, is a type of adverse childhood
experience (ACE) that can constitute trauma, an adversity that causes
long-term harm to a child.121 Trauma is
any experience or event that overwhelms a person’s ability to
cope and elicits feelings of terror, powerlessness, and out-ofcontrol physiological arousal. Trauma typically occurs when a
person is faced with an intense, frightening event (or series of
events) or a set of circumstances that are physically or emotionally harmful or life threatening that persists without appropriate
support and intervention.122

Research increasingly shows that school brutality can be traumatizing, and it is often re-traumatizing for a child who has suffered
previous trauma.123 Corporal punishment, seclusion, and restraint at
school have qualities in common with experiences that can be traumatic, including corporal punishment at home, community violence,
and witnessing domestic violence.124 All of these experiences involve
violence that destroys trust, causes physical harm, and violates a
Right Not to Be Hit, Also a Children’s Right,” Jan. 2008, at 3, https://rm.coe.int/children
-and-corporal-punishment-the-right-not-to-be-hit-also-a-childr/16806da87b [https://perma
.cc/78FT-J2Q3].
119. See id. (“Corporal punishment of children often becomes inhuman or degrading,
and it always violates their physical integrity, demonstrates disrespect for human dignity
and undermines self-esteem.”).
120. See Tuchinda, supra note 23, at 793.
121. See Johnson, supra note 78; ISSUE BRIEF #1, supra note 80; Tuchinda, supra note
23, at 790 (describing the profound and myriad ways in which trauma can impairs the
academic and behavioral functioning of children at school); Billy Kobin, Kentucky lawmaker
makes renewed effort to ban paddling and corporal punishment in schools, LOUISVILLE
COURIER J. (Jan. 5, 2021, 2:59 PM), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics
/ky-general-assembly/2021/01/05/kentucky-lawmaker-tries-again-ban-paddling-corporal
-punishment-schools/4140075001 [https://perma.cc/EW4Z-QR5E] (quoting Kentucky State
Representative Tina Bojanowski, a teacher, who indicated that school corporal punishment is another adverse childhood experience that can be traumatic).
122. Tuchinda, supra note 23, at 794.
123. See, e.g., ISSUE BRIEF #1, supra note 80 (indicating that restraint and seclusion
are traumatic and, for those who have already experienced trauma, re-traumatizing).
124. See Cronholm et al., supra note 31, at 358; Finkelhor et al., supra note 31, at 16;
Robert Sege et al., Effective Discipline to Raise Healthy Children, PEDIATRICS, 2008, at
4 (recognizing the recommendation that spanking be considered as an adverse childhood
experience).
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person’s physical integrity. Further, corporal punishment, seclusion,
and restraint at school are forms of community violence.125 Accordingly, corporal punishment, seclusion, and restraint at school should
be identified as ACEs.
Like other forms of trauma, school brutality can have a profound
physical, mental, and academic toll.126 Scientific studies indicate that
the majority of “children experience a potentially traumatic event
before age eighteen and that the more adversity [a child experiences],
the more likely they are to experience impairments in health, learning, and behavior.”127 Recent research reveals that trauma overactivates and dysregulates the stress-response system so that the
body experiences unrelenting and debilitating stress, called toxic
stress.128 Toxic stress causes inflammation in multiple body systems
and changes gene expression, increasing the risk of disease and disability during childhood and adulthood and early death.129 Due to the
vulnerability of the developing brain to extreme and chronic stress,
trauma reorganizes the architecture of children’s brains, causing the
parts of the brain that are responsible for the fight or flight response,
fear, anxiety, and impulsivity to overproduce neural connections,
while decreasing the development of neural connections in the parts
of the brain needed for behavioral self-regulation and academic success.130 Specifically, trauma decreases neural connectivity in the
parts of the brain responsible for executive function (paying attention, learning from mistakes, making measured judgments, organizing, and managing one’s emotions); memory; logical and sequential
thinking; and language development.131 Trauma also increases the
risk of behavioral impairments by causing deficits in self-regulation
and social-emotional skills and increasing hypersensitivity to nonthreatening environmental stimuli.132
Accordingly, the consequences of childhood trauma include
increased likelihood of academic decline and failure; acting aggressively or disruptively at school; absenteeism and disengagement
with school; need for special education; difficulty in forming positive
relationships with peers and adults; school suspension, expulsion,
and involvement in the juvenile delinquency and criminal justice
systems.133 Trauma causes and worsens mental health conditions,
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Cf. Finkelhor et al., supra note 31, at 13.
Tuchinda, supra note 23, at 785–98.
Id. at 786.
Id. at 798.
Id. at 787, 798.
Id. at 799.
Id.
Tuchinda, supra note 23, at 800–01.
Id. at 789–93, 801–02.
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especially post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, attention deficit
disorder, and depression.134
Thus, contrary to traditional views that physical punishment of
schoolchildren promotes “group discipline” and “control” of children,135
studies indicate that seclusion, restraint, and corporal punishment
lead to “an increase in the behaviors that schools are attempting to
eliminate or control.”136 Children who have endured any of these
practices are “more likely to be aggressive” and “misbehave over
time.”137 Research shows that school corporal punishment increases
the possibility that a student will become involved in the delinquency
or criminal system.138 Research also indicates that school corporal
punishment is associated with lower self-efficacy and self-esteem
and lower scores in vocabulary, math, and executive functioning.139
Seclusion and restraint negatively impact a child’s educational
learning and damage relationships between children and adults.140
Conversely, programs that have reduced or eliminated seclusion and
restraint have realized positive outcomes, including greater effectiveness in improving behaviors, reduced youth and staff injuries,
decreased staff turnover, higher staff satisfaction, and significant cost
savings.141 In other words, research indicates that public systems
that educate, rehabilitate, treat, and incarcerate children and youth
will save money and become more effective in managing behavior if
they stop corporally punishing, secluding, and restraining children
and youth.142
134. Id. at 792.
135. See Ingraham v. Graham, 430 U.S. 651, 661–62 (1977) (concluding that the prevalent rule privileges “such force as a teacher or administrator ‘reasonably believes to be
necessary for (the child’s) proper control, training, or education’ ”).
136. ISSUE BRIEF #1, supra note 80, at 2; SECLUSIONS & RESTRAINTS, supra note 81;
Ross, supra note 64 (including that Dr. Michael George, Director of Centennial School, says
that seclusion and restraint “contribute to the problem” because “they make children
angrier . . . resentful . . . want to engage in more aggression, to get even, to get back.” Children who had been restrained in other schools echoed these sentiments in interviews.).
137. Gershoff & Font, supra note 21, at 12 (describing how corporal punishment increases aggression at home and school); QUALITYRTS., Strategies to end seclusion and restraint: WHO QualityRights specialized training course guide, WORLD HEALTH ORG.(2019),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/329605/9789241516754-eng.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QVK3-G7KZ] (“Evidence shows that seclusion and restraints can make feelings
of frustration and anger worse, resulting in more harmful behavior.”); Ross, supra note 64.
138. Johnson, supra note 78, at 10 (using data from 2013–14 year).
139. Gershoff & Font, supra note 21, at 11.
140. Abamu & Manning, supra note 16.
141. Id.; Jennifer Richards & Jodi Cohen, These schools did away with seclusion and
restraint. They say Illinois can too., CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune
.com/investigations/ct-seclusion-restraint-alternatives-grafton-20200413-bfw7u2srp bao3
pffhcjdnhr2qq-story.html (describing the benefits of Ukeru, which bans the use of restraints
and focuses on comforting youth and helping them regulate emotions during crises).
142. See id.
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Consistent with such research, a large body of research on the
effects of corporal punishment by parents show that such punishment is ineffective in improving behavior over the long term, can be
traumatic, and has numerous unintended negative effects.143 Studies show that the “more children receive physical punishment, the
more defiant they are and the less likely they are to empathize with
others.”144 Corporal punishment by parents is associated with more
physical and verbal aggression, physical fighting and bullying,
antisocial behavior, and behavior problems generally.145 Unintended
negative effects include increased stress levels; perpetrating violence on family members; higher rates of mental health problems,
such as anxiety, depression, and psychological maladjustment; alcohol
and drug use; lower cognitive ability and academic achievement; and
a more negative parent-child relationship.146
In response to the research, the U.S. Department of Education
has declared that it has found that there is “no evidence that using
restraint or seclusion is effective in reducing the occurrence of the
problem behaviors.”147 Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Education has stated that “restraint and seclusion should be never be used
except in situations where a child’s behavior poses imminent danger
of serious physical harm to self or others.”148 Similarly, in 2016, the
U.S. Department of Education sent a letter urging state leaders to
end corporal punishment in schools due to the practice’s short-term
and long-term effects on students.149
Multiple national mental health organizations, including the
Substance Abuse Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA)
in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and
the National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors
(NASMHPD), have deemed “the use of seclusion or restraint [to be]
the result of treatment failure” in programs that address behavioral
health.150 Restraint originated in hospitals and psychiatric institutions, particularly in the treatment of violent persons.151 Although
143. See Gershoff & Font, supra note 21, at 12; Elizabeth Gershoff, Report on Physical
Punishment in the United States: What the Research Tells Us About Its Effects on Children,
13, 15–16 (2008), http://www.nospank.net/gershoff.pdf [https://perma.cc/ES9Z-H9R9].
144. Gershoff, supra note 143, at 13.
145. Id. at 13–14.
146. Id. at 15–16.
147. U.S. DEP’T EDUC., supra note 68, at iii.
148. Id.
149. Letter from John B. King, Jr. to Governors and Chief State School Officers (Nov. 22,
2016) [hereinafter Letter from John B. King, Jr.] (on file with the U.S. Dep’t of Educ.).
150. See ISSUE BRIEF #1, supra note 80.
151. COUNSEL OF PARENTS, ADVOCS. & ATT’YS, The Crisis of Trauma and Abuse in Our
Nation’s Schools 12 (2020).
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seclusion and restraint were traditionally thought to create a safer
and more secure environment for children with behavioral health
problems and adults who cared for them, research contradicts this.152
Further, even though seclusion and restraint were once perceived
as therapeutic, this misconception has been challenged and refuted
through multiple studies.153
Another misconception has been that “seclusion and restraint
are used only when absolutely necessary as crisis response techniques.”154 However, research in behavioral health settings, where
many children receive treatment, reveal that “seclusion and restraint
are most commonly used to address loud, disruptive, noncompliant
behavior and generally originate from a power struggle between
consumer and staff.”155 “The decision to apply seclusion or restraint
techniques is often arbitrary, idiosyncratic, and generally avoidable,” SAMHSA observes.156
Parents have complained that they do not want anyone hitting
their children.157 Such complaints are consistent with a parent’s
right to the “custody and management of his or her children,” a right
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court.158 Most states that allow
school corporal punishment do not allow parents to opt out of the
practice, however. And in states such as Texas, where parents can
sign a form to indicate that their child is not to be corporally punished
at school, those forms are occasionally lost by schools.159
Despite traditional beliefs that corporal punishment is “reasonably necessary ‘for the proper education of the child,’”160 school
brutality does not create an environment that promotes learning.
Instead, research shows that physical safety at school is necessary for
students to learn.161 Students who do not worry about their safety
feel more connected to their school and care more about their educational experience.162 “Physical safety at school is related to higher
152. See Letter from John B. King, Jr., supra note 149, at 2.
153. Id.
154. ISSUE BRIEF #1, supra note 80, at 2.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 3.
158. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
159. See, e.g., ISSUE BRIEF #1, supra note 80.
160. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (“[T]he State itself may impose such
corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary ‘for the proper education of the child.’”).
161. See NAT’L DROPOUT PREVENTION CTR., Safe Learning Environments, https://drop
outprevention.org/effective-strategies/safe-learning-environments [https://perma.cc/6UUL
-PKAB] (last visited Apr. 7, 2022) (“Students cannot learn in an unsafe environment.”).
162. NAT’L CTR. ON SAFE SUPPORTIVE LEARNING ENV’T, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Physical
Safety [hereinafter NAT’L CTR. LEARNING ENV’T], https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov
/topic-research/safety/physical-safety [https://perma.cc/YA3H-VCBP] (last visited Apr. 7,
2022).
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academic performance, fewer risky behaviors, and lower dropout
rates.”163 The U.S. Department of Education has indicated that acts of
violence by school staff or police at school “imperil safety for students
and staff, and undermine the teaching and learning climate.”164 “Positive relationships between students and staff—not police presence
or corporal punishment—is a strong predictor of school safety.”165 As
the U.S. Department of Education has concluded, “[i]t is essential that
all students have the opportunity to attend schools that provide a safe
environment where they can thrive and fully engage in their studies
without the distraction and worry about physical safety concerns.”166
Unfortunately, American public schools are not effective at
creating a sense of physical safety for children and their parents. “In
2019, only 21.6 percent of students reported feeling satisfied with
their safety at school, compared with 76 percent of educators and 35
percent of parents.”167 In 2020, approximately 41 percent of students
experienced anxiety regarding safety concerns at school.168 Nearly
half of the students were unable to relax as a result of their safety
concerns, and more than half of the students experienced unstable
emotions and inability to focus in class as a result of safety concerns
at school.169 Children, especially Black children, have complained
that SROs do not make them feel safe and instead make them feel
unvalued, intimidated, and threatened.170 Unfortunately, “school
safety” is often more about making adult, governmental employees
feel safe at the expense of children.171
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Klein, supra note 96.
166. NAT’L CTR. LEARNING ENV’T, supra note 162.
167. Id.
168. SAFE & SOUND SCH., 2020 STATE OF SCHOOL SAFETY REPORT 23 (2020), https://
www.safeandsoundschools.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020-State-of-School-Safety
-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P255-KLPT].
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Sarah Schwartz, Stephen Sawchuk, Eeesha Pendharkar & Ileana Najarro,
These Districts Defunded Their School Police. What Happened Next?, EDUC. WEEK (June 4,
2021) (describing how a sophomore at Logan High School who was the co-president of
the Black Student Leaders student group in La Crosse, Wisconsin, expressed that SROs
do not make her feel safe); Sawchuk, supra note 33 (“Having an SRO is like having a
note on my back that says, ‘I’m not valuable,’ ”); Tonya Mosley, School Systems ReEvaluate School Police Following George Floyd Murder, WBUR (June 14, 2021), https://
www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2021/06/14/school-resource-officers [https://perma.cc/XUZ3
-5563] (reporting that Chaya Davis, co-leader of Black Student Leaders in La Crosse,
Wisconsin, says she feels “very intimidated” by SROs, who she says are more of “a threat
than a protector”).
171. See, e.g., Sawchuk, supra note 33 (explaining that surveys from Chicago educators
and community members showed that “a third of students felt that SROs tried to build
relationships with students while over half of teachers felt that way and three-quarters
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In summary, current understandings of trauma and the effects
of the use of physical force on children’s behavior, sense of safety,
learning, and well-being make clear that school corporal punishment,
restraint, seclusion, and other applications of force on children are
unreasonable, excessive, and unwarranted. The only exception is the
use of restraint when a child’s behavior poses an imminent threat
of serious physical harm upon self or others.
B. The Prevalence of School Brutality and Its Disproportionate
Harm upon Black Children and Children with Disabilities
We ultimately envision corporal punishment being
totally removed [from the district policies]. But we
also had some pretty intense discussions. . . . Corporal punishment is ingrained in students and the
culture of our area. In that conversation, we had
students say, ‘Yes, we need it.’ And parents said,
‘Yes, we need it.’ It’s been so much a part of [the culture]. So we were not going to strip it all the way
out, but we reduced it.
—Anonymous school administrator, Jackson, Mississippi172
How common is school brutality? School brutality remains widespread and under-reported.173 Although no central database collects
information about school brutality, public schools self-reported that
they corporally punished K–12 students nearly 100,000 times in the
2017–18 school year.174 They also reported restraining and/or secluding approximately 122,000 students during the 2015–16 school year,
up from nearly 70,000 students during the 2013–14 school year.175
Such self-reports are significant undercounts, however, and data from
2018–2019 shows that in many places, incidents of restraint and
seclusion continue to rise.176
of administrators did . . . nearly 40 percent of teachers agreed that school police are
necessary because ‘too many students are out of control’ ”).
172. Anne Buffington, Lisa Long & Ben Walker, PowerPoint Presentation, Disciplinary
Procedures in Mississippi’s Public Schools: A Look at What Educators Have to Say (Aug. 22,
2018) (on file with author).
173. See Mitchell, supra note 19 (explaining that the U.S. Government Accountability
Office found that seclusion and restraint are chronically under-reported); Anderson,
supra note 116 (reporting corporal punishment incidents have declined in recent years,
but the practice is still widely in use).
174. Keierleber, supra note 19.
175. Mitchell, supra note 19.
176. See id.; Geoff Ward, Nick Peterson, Aaron Kupchik & James Pratt, Historic Lynching and Corporal Punishment in Contemporary Southern Schools, 68 SOC. PROBS. 41, 58
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Regarding corporal punishment, existing data shows that during
the 2013–14 school year, eleven percent of U.S. school districts practiced corporal punishment.177 On average, in the schools that practiced corporal punishment, the rate of students struck at least once
was 5.6 percent that school year.178 However, the rates of corporal
punishment were as high as 9.3 percent of students in Mississippi;
7.5 percent in Arkansas; 6.1 percent in Missouri; 5.9 percent in
Alabama; and 5.6 percent in Oklahoma.179 The top twenty-five school
districts with the highest corporal punishment rates in 2013–14
corporally punished from 20.1 percent to 56.8 percent of their student populations.180
Eighty percent of school corporal punishment occurs in seven,
mostly Southern states: Mississippi, Texas, Alabama, Arkansas,
Georgia, Tennessee, and Oklahoma.181 Mississippi alone accounted
for almost a quarter of all corporal punishment in the United States
in 2013–14;182 state employees subjected students to such punishment 28,000 times in 2017–18.183
On a county level, urbanized counties and “counties with larger
college-educated populations have a lower prevalence and incidence of
corporal punishment . . . while counties with higher poverty rates have
a higher corporal punishment prevalence.”184 Corporal punishment
occurs more often in rural areas, areas with greater concentrations
of Republican voters, and places where Evangelical Protestantism
thrives.185
The federal government requires all public schools to report incidents of seclusion and restraint, but investigations, media accounts,
and testimony from lawmakers have revealed that schools chronically under-report such incidents.186 To illustrate, in June 2019, the
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that “70 percent
(2021) (stating that incidents of corporal punishment are under-reported); Keierleber,
supra note 19; see, e.g., Abamu & Manning, supra note 16 (“incidents of restraint and
seclusion are on the rise in Vancouver”).
177. Johnson, supra note 78, at 9–10 (reporting that in 2015–16, 5.3 percent of students
were struck in schools that practice corporal punishment).
178. Johnson, supra note 78, at 13.
179. Johnson, supra note 78, at 10, 13.
180. Id. at 15.
181. Dick Startz, Schools, black children, and corporal punishment, BROOKINGS (Jan. 14,
2016), https://brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/2016/01/14/schools-black-chil
dren-and-corporal-punishment [https://perma.cc/EHM7-Y4YR].
182. Johnson, supra note 78, at 9 (explaining data from 2013–14 year).
183. Keierleber, supra note 19.
184. Ward, Peterson, Kupchik & Pratt, supra note 176, at 50, 52.
185. Id. at 47, 50; see also Gershoff & Font, supra note 21, at 410–11 (finding greater
support for corporal punishment in Evangelical Protestantism and states that Republican
candidates won in the 2012 elections).
186. Abamu & Manning, supra note 16.
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of the more than 17,000 school districts in the U.S. reported zero
incidents of restraint and zero incidents of seclusion” for school year
2015–16.187 However, the GAO found “substantial evidence that nine
of the 30 largest districts (those with more than 100,000 students)
inaccurately reported zero [incidents] when they actually had incidents or did not have the data.”188 For instance, Fairfax County Public
Schools in Virginia reported zero incidents of restraint and seclusion
in 2015–16, but it later acknowledged, after an investigation by NPR,
that it had over 1,600 such incidents in 2017–18.189 The GAO has concluded that school district reporting on seclusion and restraint
incidents “does not accurately or completely reflect all incidents of
restraint and seclusion of public school students.”190
Regarding police actions at school, the increased involvement
of law enforcement officers in school discipline suggests that more
children will be handcuffed, and children will continue to be assaulted
by these officers.191 SROs, which are police officers who have the
authority to arrest children, were rare before the Columbine High
School massacre in 1999.192 Since then, the federal government has
invested more than $1 billion to subsidize the placement of police in
schools, resulting in approximately 46,000 SROs in elementary and
secondary public schools.193 “As of 2020, nearly 60 percent of all schools
and 90 percent of high schools now have a law enforcement officer
[such as an SRO] at least part-time.”194 Accordingly, six million students attend schools with police, but no school psychologists; 1.7 million students attend schools with police, but no school counselor; 10
million students attend schools with police, but no social workers.195
187. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., Letter from Jacqueline M. Nowicki to U.S.
Representatives Patty Murray, Rosa DeLauro, and Tom Cole 1, 3 (June 18, 2019), https://
www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-551r.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X27-NNUM].
188. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., K–12 Education: Education Should Take
Immediate Action to Address Inaccuracies in Federal Restraint and Seclusion Data
(July 11, 2019), https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-19-551r [https://perma.cc/E4LN-EDQG]
(last visited Apr. 7, 2022).
189. See id.
190. Id.
191. See Barnum, supra note 43.
192. Darby, supra note 65.
193. Macklin Reid, Police in schools: Ridgefield school board makes no comment, THE
RIDGEFIELD PRESS (Oct. 24, 2020, 7:27 PM), https://www.theridgefieldpress.com/news/ar
ticle/Police-in-schools-Ridgefield-school-board-makes-15664781.php#:~:text=%E2%80%
9CSince%201999%20the%20federal%20government%20has%20invested%20more,ele
mentary%20and%20secondary%20public%20schools%20across%20the%20nation
[https://perma.cc/D8YW-UMKU].
194. Karen Dolan, Cecelia Scheuer & Uma Nagarajan-Swenson, REIMAGINING
SCHOOL SAFETY, INST.POL’Y STUD. 6 (Sept. 2020), https://ips-dc.org/report-reimagining
-school-safety; see Darby, supra note 65.
195. Dolan, Scheuer & Nagarajan-Swenson, supra note 194; see also S. 2125, 117th
Cong. §§ 2(17), (18), (20), (21) (2021) (recording that professional standards recommend
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More police officers in schools means more arrests of children
in school. To illustrate, in 2017–18, 61.4 percent of all U.S. public
schools and 72.3 percent of all U.S. high schools had a sworn law enforcement officer, such as an SRO, present and carrying a firearm
at school at least once a week.196 Of those public schools, 51 percent
had officers who participated in school discipline, and the addition
of each officer to a public school led to approximately two and a half
extra in-school arrests annually of children under the age of fifteen.197 “[S]chools with a designated law enforcement officer on duty
arrested students at 5 times the rate of comparable schools without
such an officer.”198 In other words, the unfortunate “explosion in the
number of officers in schools . . . has resulted in skyrocketing numbers of students being arrested at school for nonviolent infractions,”
which schools previously addressed through detention and other
non-carceral methods.199
Meanwhile, incidents of mass school violence, such as mass
shootings, remain rare.200 The over-involvement of law enforcement
officers in schools has caused many students to feel that school is a
prison-like environment.201
Unfortunately, while data is collected about school arrests of
children, a lack of data exists regarding how children are treated by
law enforcement officers and security guards at school. News reports have uncovered beatings and other cruel applications of force
by such state agents against children,202 especially children of
color,203 but more research is needed to determine how often school
brutality by these state agents is occurring; the extent to which
these state agents are involved in regular school discipline matters;
the demographics of the children impacted; the extent of the use of
force by these state agents; and the extent of physical and emotional
at least one counselor and one social worker for every 250 students and at least one
psychologist for every 700 students).
196. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., Table 233.70, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest
/d19/tables/dt19_233.70.asp [https://perma.cc/EN28-9QEW] (last visited Apr. 7, 2022).
197. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., POLICIES OUTLINING THE ROLE OF SWORN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (May 2020), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2020/2020027
.pdf [https://perma.cc/TD5G-HC3R]; Emily Owens, Testing the School-to-Prison Pipeline,
36 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 11, 29 (2017).
198. S. 2125, 117th Cong. § 2(5) (2021).
199. Darby, supra note 65.
200. Barnum, supra note 43.
201. See Darby, supra note 65.
202. See, e.g., Deliso & Ghebremedhin, supra note 37 (describing how a school resource
officer audibly slammed the head of a sixteen-year-old Black girl onto the ground, knocking her unconscious, and causing memory loss, headaches, blurry vision, sleep deprivation,
and depression).
203. S. 2125, 117th Cong. § 2(1) (2021).
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injuries from their use of force. In particular, research is needed to
assess why and how educators involve security guards and law enforcement officers into school discipline matters.
Despite problems in reporting of school brutality, data indicates
that school brutality disproportionately afflicts Black children and
children with disabilities.204 Specifically, research shows that Black
students receive corporal punishment 2.5 times more often than other
students, and students with disabilities are about two times more
likely to receive corporal punishment than their peers.205 Regarding
restraint and seclusion, even though children with disabilities make
up only approximately 13 percent of the total student population at
K–12 schools, they constitute more than 80 percent and 77 percent
of the students who are restrained and secluded, respectively.206 Black
girls are 2.17 times more likely than white girls to be restrained,
and Black boys are 1.58 times more likely than white boys to be restrained.207 Boys with disabilities are also disproportionately harmed:
83 percent and 84 percent of the students with disabilities who are
restrained and secluded, respectively, are male.208
II. LEGAL STRUCTURES LEGALIZING AND
FACILITATING SCHOOL BRUTALITY
Multiple legal structures facilitate and legalize school brutality
upon children. This section describes the structures and identifies
ways to improve the law to end school brutality.
A. Teacher Privilege: The Colonial Root of the Legalization of
School Brutality
The legalization of school corporal punishment is rooted in an
outdated tort law privilege that originated during colonial times.209
204. Ashley MacSuga-Gage, Nicholas Gage, Antonis Katsyannis, Shanna E. Hirsch &
Hannah Kisner, Disproportionate Corporal Punishment of Students with Disabilities and
Black and Hispanic Students, 32 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 212, 220–21 (2021).
205. Gershoff & Font, supra note 21, at 413; MacSuga-Gage, Gage, Katsyannis, Hirsch
& Kisner, supra note 204, at 217.
206. U.S. DEP’T EDUC., OFF. C.R., 2017–18 CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION: THE USE
OF RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION ON CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES IN K–12 SCHOOLS 2, 6–7
(2020) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS DATA].
207. GEORGETOWN L. CTR. POVERTY & INEQUALITY, Data Snapshot: 2017–2018 National
Data on School Discipline by Race and Gender (2020), https://genderjusticeandopportu
nity.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/National-Data-on-School-Discipline-by
-Race-and-Gender.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZW4-QW7L].
208. CIVIL RIGHTS DATA, supra note 206, at 13–14.
209. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660 (1977); Keierleber, supra note 19 (“To
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Ordinarily, tort and criminal law give the greatest protection to physical security of persons.210 “Intentional and negligent physical interference with persons are both ordinarily tortious in the absence of
a good justification,” enabling victims of such interference to “recover
for all her reasonably connected damages, including reasonable
damages for emotional harm.”211 School brutality would normally
encompass the torts of battery, assault, false arrest, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.212 Similarly,
criminal law typically would punish the hitting of another person,
physically forcing another person to the ground, keeping someone
in a room involuntarily, and preventing a person from moving as
crimes.213 Both tort and criminal law deter wrongful conduct and
confirm and reinforce public standards of behavior.214 Criminal law
protects the public interest by enabling the state to protect the health,
safety, welfare, well-being, and tranquility of the community.215
As recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1977 in Ingraham
v. Wright, however, common law provided teachers with a tort law
privilege to impose “reasonable but not excessive force to discipline
a child.”216 This privilege arose from the historical use of corporal
punishment in schools since the colonial period.217 The U.S. Supreme
Court commented,
Although the early cases viewed the authority of the teacher as
deriving from the parents, the concept of parental delegation has
been replaced by the view—more consonant with compulsory
education laws—that the State itself may impose such corporal
its detractors, corporal punishment in schools is an antiquated and damaging vestige of
the past.”).
210. See Dan E. Dobbs et al., HORNBOOK ON TORTS 5–6 (2d ed. 2015) (“Legal rules give
the greatest protection to physical security of persons and property.”).
211. Id. at 5.
212. Cf. Peterson v. Baker, 504 F.3d 1131, 1134, 1137, 1140 (11th Cir. 2007) (describing
when a parent sued for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress after a
teacher grabbed and squeezed her son’s neck as he tried to leave the teacher’s classroom,
but the court held that the student’s misconduct justified some corporal punishment, and
the amount of force used was “reasonably related to the need for punishment”).
213. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (making a criminal offense “intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to another” or “physical contact with
another when the person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard
the contact as offensive or provocative”).
214. See Dobbs et al., supra note 210, at 6; MATTHEW LIPPMAN, CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL LAW: CONCEPTS: CASES, AND CONTROVERSIES 1–2 (2018) (explaining that crimes are
conduct that result in the “‘formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation
of the community’ ”).
215. See LIPPMAN, supra note 214, at 1–2.
216. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 661 (1977).
217. Id. at 660.
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punishment as is reasonably necessary “for the proper education
of the child and for the maintenance of group discipline.”218

The prevalent rule in America, the Court concluded, “privileges such
force as a teacher or administrator ‘reasonably believes to be necessary
for the child’s proper control, training, or education.’”219 According
to the common law, to the extent that the force used was reasonable
in light of its purpose, it was not wrongful, but rather “justifiable or
lawful.”220 The Supreme Court also concluded that the justifiability
of reasonable corporal punishment in school was recognized in the
laws of most states because in 1977, most states authorized corporal
punishment in school.221 Since then, however, as described in Section II.B, most states decided to prohibit the use of corporal punishment in school.222
Nevertheless, in the last five years, despite Ingraham concluding
that the teacher privilege to corporally punish children no longer derives from delegation of parental authority,223 courts in states that
permit school corporal punishment still express the traditional view
that public school teachers “stand in loco parentis, ‘in the place of a
parent’ with respect to students in their classrooms who they must
supervise and control.”224 They have held that teachers accordingly
“owe a general duty of supervision to the students placed within [their]
care . . . . This parent-like role encompasses authority to discipline
children.”225 Because parents are authorized via common law to
discipline their children “using reasonable physical punishments,”
some state courts have concluded that teachers do not commit a
218. Id. at 662 (quoting F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS 292 (1956)).
219. Id. at 661 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147(2) (AM. L. INST. 1965).
220. Id. Scientific research now robustly shows that the application of physical force
upon school children is virtually never necessary for a child’s proper control, training,
or education. See supra Section I.A.
221. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 661.
222. Gershoff & Font, supra note 21, at 408.
223. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 662 (1977).
Although the early cases viewed the authority of the teacher as deriving from
the parents, the concept of parental delegation has been replaced by the
view more consonant with compulsory education laws that the State itself
may impose such corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary “for the
proper education of the child and for the maintenance of group discipline.”
Id. (quoting F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS 292 (1956)).
224. See, e.g., Morris v. State, 228 So. 3d 670, 672 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017); Barocas
v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1256, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); Cleveland v. Pembroke, No. 2005
-CRB-39185, 2006 WL 6846157 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. June 21, 2006). Some states, such
as Indiana, codified the tort privilege and the in loco parentis doctrine. See IND. CODE
§ 20-33-8-8(b).
225. See, e.g., Morris, 228 So. 3d at 673 (quoting Rupp v. Bryant, 417, So. 2d 658, 666
(Fla. 1982)).
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crime or tort by inflicting corporal punishment on a child subject to
their authority.226
The Florida District Court of Appeal, for instance, held in 2017
that, “[j]ust as parents are privileged to administer corporal discipline to their children and touch them non-abusively against their
will, ‘the law permits, by privilege, a simple battery in the administration of discipline’ by [other persons with] authority over a child.”227
The court held that the “parental corporal discipline privilege extends
specifically to teachers and school personnel acting in loco parentis,
negating their potential liability for committing simple battery.”228
With this reasoning, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed
the conviction of a teacher’s aide for misdemeanor battery for slapping and pulling the leg of a four-year-old child.229 Courts applying
tort common law have generally been unsympathetic to assault and
battery claims after school brutality incidents.230
Aspects of the teacher privilege have even seeped into some
states’ criminal law. Some state appellate courts have held that, to
convict a teacher of criminal assault, prosecutors must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the corporal punishment inflicted upon a
pupil is “unreasonable and . . . not reasonably necessary to preserve
discipline.”231 Other courts have reasoned that, in addition to “the
presumption of innocence shared by all criminal defendants,” they
also presume teachers “do their duty when punishing a student.”232
The teacher privilege to corporally punish children is built on
the notion that schools stand in the place of a parent, but this notion
has been eroded by multiple U.S. Supreme Court decisions and
compulsory education laws.233 As recognized by Ingraham v. Wright,
the fact that education is now compulsory in every state means that
children must receive an education even if their parents do not want
one for them.234 Accordingly, school staff do not stand in place of the
parent when it cannot be assumed that all parents agree with
226. See, e.g., id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., Barocas, 949 N.E.2d at 1261; Cleveland, No. 2005-CRB-39185, 2006 WL
6846157 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. June 21, 2006); DAVID DOVERSPIKE & W. HENRY CONE, THE
PRINCIPAL AND THE LAW 6 (1992).
231. See, e.g., State v. Hoover, 450 N.E.2d 710, 714 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).
232. See, e.g., Littleton v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1070, 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); Barocas,
949 N.E.2d at 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); Cleveland, No. 2005-CRB-39185, 2006 WL
6846157 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. June 21, 2006).
233. See Timothy Garrison, From Parent to Protector: The History of Corporal Punishment in American Public Schools, 16 J. CONT. LEGAL ISSUES 115, 117 (2007).
234. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977).
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sending their child to school.235 The U.S. Supreme Court also weakened the in loco parentis doctrine by indicating that the doctrine
does not immunize school officials from having to respect the constitutional rights of schoolchildren.236
In particular, in 1985, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court held that
the argument, based on the in loco parentis doctrine, that teachers
and school administrators’ dealings with students are not subject to
the limits of the Fourth Amendment is “in tension with contemporary reality and the teachings of this Court.”237 The Court held that
“[i]n carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to [publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies],
school officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they cannot claim the parents’ immunity
from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.”238 The Supreme Court
held in T.L.O. that the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public
school officials.239
Consistent with that holding, the U.S. Supreme Court in 2009
chose not to apply the in loco parentis doctrine to justify an assistant
principal’s strip search of thirteen-year-old Savana Redding, who was
suspected of secretly holding drugs in Safford Unified School District
No. 1 v. Redding.240 The Court held in Redding that the search, which
involved “exposing [the child’s] breasts and pelvic area [to school staff]
to some degree,” violated the child’s Fourth Amendment rights.241
Justice Thomas’s dissent asserted that “[i]f the common-law
view that parents delegate to teachers their authority to discipline
and maintain order were to be applied in this case, the search of
Redding would stand.”242 Justice Thomas’s dissent complained that
the majority’s opinion granted judges “sweeping authority to secondguess the measures that [school officials] take to maintain discipline
in . . . schools.”243 He argued that the Court should return to the
235. See Garrison, supra note 233, at 117.
236. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)
(concluding without mentioning the in loco parentis doctrine that school officials unconstitutionally suppressed students’ freedom of expression by suspending students until
they stopped wearing armbands that silently protested the Vietnam War and holding
that “[s]chool officials do not possess absolute authority over their students.”).
237. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985).
238. Id. at 336–37.
239. Id. at 337.
240. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 379 (2009).
241. Id. at 368–69 (looking for pills, a school nurse and assistant principal had Savana
remove her outer clothing, pull her bra out and shake it, pull out the elastic on her
underpants).
242. Id. at 399.
243. Id. at 382–83.
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doctrine of in loco parentis, under which “the judiciary was reluctant
to interfere in the routine business of school administration, allowing
schools and teachers to set and enforce rules and to maintain order.”244
Increasing judicial reluctance to apply the in loco parentis doctrine is positive because the prevailing notion that school officials
act as representatives of the state who enact “publicly mandated
educational and disciplinary policies” means that school officials have
a greater likelihood of adhering to practices that are supported by
scientific evidence, rather than practices supported primarily by
tradition.245 School brutality can end when courts stop relying on the
in loco parentis doctrine or the colonial teacher privilege to justify
corporally punishing schoolchildren.
B. Limitations in Constitutional Law Protections Against School
Brutality
Unfortunately, constitutional law’s current capacity to end school
brutality perpetrated by teachers and school administrators is very
limited because it has supported the tort teacher privilege to corporally punish students.246 However, claims under the Fourth Amendment have succeeded in vindicating the rights of children who have
been handcuffed by sworn law enforcement officers at school.247
Parents whose children have died or been injured from school brutality have pursued causes of action under the Eighth, Fourteenth,
and Fourth Amendments, while using 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as their
basis, but these causes of action have generally been unsuccessful
except Fourth Amendment claims against handcuffing by law enforcement officers.248
244. Id. at 383 (internal quotations omitted).
245. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336–37 (1985).
246. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 693 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (“Although
the respondent school authorities provide absolutely no process to the student before the
punishment is finally inflicted, the majority concludes that the student is nonetheless
given due process because he can later sue the teacher and recover damages if the punishment was ‘excessive.’ ”).
247. See C.B. v. Sonora Sch. Dist., 691 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1181–82 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
248. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress[.]
Id.; Susan Ostrander & Amy Halpert, The Crisis of Trauma and Abuse in Our Nation’s
Schools, COUNCIL PARENT ATT’YS & ADVOCS., INC. 14 (2020), https://cdn.ymaws.com.ww
copaa.org/resource/resmgr/docs/2020_docs/restraint_and_seclusion_pape.pdf [https://
perma.cc/EG56-YRAJ] (stating that parents can seek constitutional law remedies in state
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1. Eighth Amendment Claims
In 1977 in Ingraham v. Wright, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected
the notion that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment applies to school corporal punishment because the Eighth Amendment is historically applied only to cases
involving criminal conviction and incarceration.249
2. Fourteenth Amendment Claims
As to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
Ingraham held that “where school authorities, acting under color of
state law, deliberately decide to punish a child for misconduct by
restraining the child and inflicting appreciable physical pain, [then]
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests are implicated.”250 Specifically, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects a minor
student’s liberty interest in being free from, and to obtain judicial
relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security.251 Such liberty
interest encompassed “freedom from bodily restraint and punishment.”252 The Court concluded that “[i]t is fundamental that the state
cannot hold and physically punish an individual except in accordance
with due process of law.”253
Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court left largely intact the
common law privilege permitting teachers to inflict reasonable, but
not excessive force or corporal punishment on children in their care
for purposes of “control, training, or education.”254 The Court found
that “[t]o the extent that the force is excessive or unreasonable, the
educator in virtually all States is subject to possible civil and criminal liability.”255
Specifically regarding two paddling instances at a public high
school in Dade County, Florida—one of an eighth grader and one of
a ninth grader—the Court was reassured that Florida’s common law,
“strengthened by statute,” recognized the right of a child not to be
or federal court, but neither path has proven fruitful); see, e.g., T.O. v. Fort Bend Indep.
Sch. Dist., 2 F. 4th 407, 414 (5th Cir. 2021) (listing numerous cases of severe school brutality, including the slamming of a student to the ground by a police officer and dragging
him along the floor after the student disrupted class, about which the Fifth Circuit dismissed substantive due process claims); Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295,
1307 (11th Cir. 2006).
249. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669.
250. Id. at 674.
251. Id. at 673–74.
252. Id. at 674.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 661, 674.
255. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 661.
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subjected to “excessive corporal punishment in school.”256 The Court
concluded that the risk that any substantive rights would be violated
by corporal punishment at school is “minimal” because the Court
found that corporal punishment is rarely severe at schools, schools
are “open” to public scrutiny, and common-law safeguards—namely
civil and criminal liability for excessive punishment—already exist.257
The Court held that state common law “constraints and remedies,”
which are civil and criminal proceedings and liability for severe
corporal punishment, satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of procedural due process, even though the process due occurs
after a punishment occurs.258
Demonstrating the implications of Ingraham’s holding regarding
procedural due process for school corporal punishment under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Circuit held in 1990 that “injuries
sustained during corporal punishment, irrespective of the severity of
these injuries or the sensitivity of the student, do not implicate the
due process clause if the forum state affords adequate post-punishment civil or criminal remedies for the student to vindicate legal
transgressions.”259
Regarding substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Ingraham left open the possibility that
school corporal punishment could violate such rights.260 The majority of circuits took the opportunity to hold that corporal punishment
of a student can violate the student’s substantive due process rights,
while a few circuits have not yet addressed the issue.261 The circuits
holding that corporal punishment can violate substantive due
process rights drew their standards from case law regarding excessive use of force by police upon adult criminal suspects who were in
police custody.262
256. Id. at 676.
257. Id. at 682.
258. Id. at 683.
259. Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 808 (5th Cir. 1990) (first emphasis added).
260. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 679 n.47 (indicating that the Court had “no occasion to decide
whether or under what circumstances corporal punishment of a public school child might
give rise to an independent federal cause of action to vindicate substantive rights under
the Due Process Clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment).
261. See Mortorano, supra note 54, at 489–90 (showing that the Second, Third, Fourth,
Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that school corporal punishment
can violate students’ substantive due process rights; the Ninth and Seventh Circuits have
applied the Fourth Amendment to school corporal punishment cases without addressing
substantive due process rights; and the First and D.C. Circuits have not yet addressed
the issue); Woodard v. Los Fresnos Indep. Sch. Dist., 732 F.2d 1243, 1246 (5th Cir. 1984)
(holding that corporal punishment in public schools “is a deprivation of substantive due
process when it is arbitrary, capricious, or wholly unrelated to the legitimate state goal
of maintaining an atmosphere conducive to learning.”).
262. Cf. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 661 (the Court found rights grounded in cases dealing
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Such standards are inappropriate for interactions between
government agents and children in schools, however, because most
of the government agents in school are educators whose main role
is to support the development of children, rather than police, whose
main role is to prevent and stop crime.263 Further, children at school
are generally not suspected of committing crimes, and they are
developmentally much more vulnerable than adults to the use of
force.264 Children at school need more protection than what the legal
standards from excessive use of force by police cases can provide.
Nevertheless, the leading case regarding substantive due process rights and school corporal punishment is Hall v. Tawney.265 In
Hall, the Fourth Circuit held that a student’s substantive due process
rights have been violated by corporal punishment in school if “the
force applied caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the
need presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather
than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to
a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to
the conscience.”266 The Fourth Circuit arrived at this standard after
reviewing cases involving excessive use of force by police upon adult
criminal suspects.267 The court reasoned, “[c]learly recognized in persons charged with or suspected of crime and in the custody of police
officers, we simply do not see how we can fail also to recognize it in
public school children under the disciplinary control of public school
teachers.”268 Most other circuits have standards similar to Hall’s for
violations of student due process rights.269
When conducting a substantive due process inquiry, federal courts
analyze most uses of force by educators, including seclusion and
restraint, as corporal punishment that is “capable of being construed
as attempt to restore order, maintain discipline, or protect a student
from self-injurious behavior.”270 Further, revealing the continued
with excessive force claims arising in the law enforcement area); Hall v. Tawney, 621
F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980).
263. See Sawchuk, supra note 33 (“[E]ven school safety experts wrestle with the
philosophical question of whether the hierarchical, command-and-control nature of
policing can be squared with the culture of schools, which is supposed to be nurturing.”).
264. See Tuchinda, supra note 23, at 799 (“Due to [the] vulnerability of the developing
nervous system to extreme and chronic stress, children’s brains are impacted disproportionately by trauma.”).
265. See Mortorano, supra note 54, at 490–91 (describing how “[t]he majority of the
circuits examine factors that are the same as or similar to Hall’s four-factor test”).
266. Hall, 621 F.2d at 613 (citation omitted).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See Mortorano, supra note 54, at 490–91; see, e.g., Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist.,
855 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1988) (establishing a four-factor test that is similar to Hall’s
test); Neal v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th Cir. 2000).
270. See T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 588, 598–99 (11th
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influence of the tort teacher privilege, courts “give school administrators substantial deference in matters such as school discipline and
maintaining order.”271 Most circuits also minimize the significance
of injuries sustained during corporal punishment as long as the
punishment is not “arbitrary, egregious, and conscience-shocking.”272
Accordingly, the fact-intensive “shock the conscience” threshold
by which most circuits find a violation of substantive due process
rights is so difficult to reach that observers have concluded that claims
under the standard are “shortsighted” and “severely limited at best”
because they are “rarely successful and only address the most egregious forms of corporal punishment in schools.”273
3. Fourth Amendment Claims
Causes of action under the Fourth Amendment are usually unavailing with regards to the use of force by teachers, but they have
helped some students who have been harmed by handcuffing by
Cir. 2010) (quoting Neal, 229 F.3d at 1073) (analyzing alleged verbal abuse, physical
abuse, and sadistic sexual behavior as corporal punishment because “[t]he key inquiry
is not what form the use of force takes but whether the use of force is ‘related to [the
student’s] misconduct at school and . . . for the purpose of discipline.’ ”).
271. Golden v. Anders, 324 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 2003).
272. See, e.g., T.W. ex rel. Wilson, 610 F.3d at 598–99 (11th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added)
(holding that the alleged sadistic sexual behavior with and verbal and physical abuse of
a student with autism did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due
process standard); Wise, 855 F.2d at 565 (“Minor discomfort and hurt feelings do not make
a federal case. The conduct must be shocking to the conscience and amount to a severe
invasion of the student’s personal security and autonomy.”); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Half
Hollow Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 168, 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding no substantive
due process violation when a teacher slapped seventh-grade student in the face “at fullforce with an open hand, allegedly causing [the child] both great physical pain and severe
emotional pain for which he underwent psychotherapy”); C.N. v. Willmar Pub. Sch., Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 347, 591 F.3d 624, 635 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding that a teacher’s allegedly
excessive use of restraints and seclusion that were part of student’s IEP do not plausibly
violate her substantive due process rights); Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863,
847–48 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that no violation of clearly established rights occurred
where teacher placed student with autism in prolonged isolation in a small, dark room
as a punishment which violated student’s IEP); London v. Dirs. of DeWitt Pub. Sch., 194
F.3d 873, 876–77 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a school coach did not violate substantive
due process when he dragged a 13-year-old student 15 feet and banged his head against
a metal pole, because the coach’s actions were not shocking to the conscience); Daniels
v. Lutz, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1046 (E.D. Ark. 2005) (holding that a teacher’s hitting of
a 15-year-old student in the eye with a folder, causing long-term injury, in an effort to
establish order in the classroom did not shock the conscience); Brown v. Johnson, 710 F.
Supp. 183, 183 (E.D. Ky. 1989) (denying substantive due process relief after a student was
paddled seven times with enough force to bruise her buttocks severely).
273. Mortorano, supra note 54, at 484, 493; accord Ostrander & Halpert, supra note
248, at 24 (“Constitutional claims are frequently unsuccessful, and plaintiffs typically
lose . . . seemingly no matter how egregious the conduct on the part of school officials.”).
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SROs.274 Most of the circuits have either not addressed claims of
Fourth Amendment violations regarding school brutality incidents
or have generally held that a use of force by an educator upon a
student was not an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.275
For instance, the Seventh Circuit held that a teacher or administrator who seizes a student does so in violation of the Fourth Amendment only when the restriction of liberty is unreasonable under the
circumstances “then existing and apparent.”276 The Seventh Circuit
held that “[d]epending on the circumstances, reasonable action may
certainly include the seizure of a student in the face of provocative
or disruptive behavior.”277 Applying this standard to the grabbing of
a sixteen-year-old student by the elbow and wrist in order to “quell
the disruption” caused by the student’s obscenities and invitation to
fight another student, the court held that the teacher’s actions were
reasonable because they were proportionate “to the interference with
the educational process that the situation presented.”278 Similarly,
the Third Circuit has held that the “momentary use of physical force
by a teacher in reaction to a disruptive or unruly student does not
effect a ‘seizure’ of the student under the Fourth Amendment.”279
The outcomes of Fourth Amendment claims against sworn law
enforcement officers who have handcuffed children at school have
been better, however.280 For instance, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the handcuffing of a “compliant, nine-year-old girl for the sole purpose
of punishing her was a violation of [her] Fourth Amendment rights.”281
Similarly, a U.S. District Court in Kentucky held that the test of
274. See, e.g., C.B. v. Sonora Sch. Dist., 691 F. Supp. 2d 1770, 1181–82.
275. Mortorano, supra note 54, at 493, 496 (“most courts have either not addressed
[Fourth Amendment claims] or held that corporal punishment is not an unreasonable
seizure”); see C.C. Swisher, Constitutional Abuse of Public School Students: An Argument
for Overruling Ingraham v. Wright, 8 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 3, 45 (2008)
(“circuits diverge over whether victimized students can make a claim under the Fourth
Amendment, but no circuit has ever found that a victimized student has presented a
compensable claim.”); see, e.g., Wallace ex rel. Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d
1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 1995). But see Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Tr., 479 F.3d
1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that if the allegations that the teacher physically
abused a four-year-old child with a neurological disorder by hitting the child repeatedly
in the head are proven true, then they would violate the Fourth Amendment).
276. Wallace, 68 F.3d at 1014.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1011, 1015.
279. Gottlieb ex rel. Calabria v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir.
2001).
280. See, e.g., C.B. v. Sonora Sch. Dist., 691 F. Supp. 2d 1770, 1174, 1180–82 (E.D. Cal.
2010) (holding that handcuffing a calm, sitting 11-year-old student in public was excessively intrusive, given the child’s age and the fact that it was not done to protect anyone’s
safety, and denying qualified immunity).
281. Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006).
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reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment requires “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including
the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he
is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”282
After recognizing that Kentucky law prohibits all school personnel,
including SROs, from using mechanical restraints on students, the
court applied the Fourth Amendment test to an SRO’s fifteen-minute
handcuffing of an eight-year-old boy who had been kicking adults
and the handcuffing of a nine-year-old girl on two occasions after
she had been kicking and hitting adults.283 The court held that the
SRO’s handcuffing of the two children was an unconstitutional
seizure and excessive force.284
Given the positive outcomes for handcuffing cases, the Fourth
Amendment may be helpful for other types of school brutality committed by law enforcement officers. Otherwise, given the continued
influence of teacher privilege, constitutional law has generally not
been helpful in protecting children from school brutality.285
C. State Statutes Regarding School Corporal Punishment
[I remember] the swoosh of the paddle, the sound
it made as it connect[ed] with [his] body . . . the
sobs for mercy. . . . The reasons a kid could be
yanked out of class . . . were inconsistent and petty.
—Liz Dwyer, South Bend, Indiana286
[T]he truth is this: paddling students in the American South is so commonplace that simply challenging the practice is unthinkable.
—Tate Henderson, Teacher287
“Between the 1980s and the mid-1990s, corporal punishment in . . .
schools declined rapidly due to waning public acceptance, increased
litigation against school boards and educators regarding its use, and
legislative bans.”288 As a result, in contrast to 1977, now most states
282. S.R. v. Kenton Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 302 F. Supp. 3d 821, 832 (E.D. Ky. 2017).
283. Id. at 824–30, 832–33.
284. Id. at 834.
285. See Swisher, supra note 275, at 60–61.
286. Anderson, supra note 116.
287. Tate Henderson Aldrich, You’d Think We Would Stop Paddling Kids in School
but You’d Be Wrong, EDUC. POST (May 10, 2021), https://educationpost.org/youd-think
-we-would-stop-paddling-kids-in-school-but-youd-be-wrong [https://perma.cc/AJ23-NE6S].
288. NAT’L ASSOC. SCH. PSYCH., supra note 67.
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prohibit school corporal punishment. Specifically, twenty-eight states
and the District of Columbia explicitly prohibit corporal punishment
by school employees in their laws; seven states do not explicitly
address school corporal punishment in their laws; and fifteen states,
which are mostly southern and mountainous states, have laws that
explicitly permit school employees to use corporal punishment or
that explicitly provide immunity for school employees to use such
punishment.289
Despite the progress of banning corporal punishment in schools,
such banning lags behind the banning of corporal punishment in
other childcare settings.290 Almost all states have banned corporal
punishment in center-based child care settings, foster care settings,
and residential care settings, including group homes and institutions.291 Most states have banned it in juvenile detention facilities.292
Congress banned it “in facilities for juveniles convicted of federal
289. For laws explicitly permitting corporal punishment or explicitly providing immunity for school employees when applying such punishment, see ALA. CODE § 16-28A-1
(1995); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-843(B)(2) (2021); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17-112(a)(1)
(2019); FLA. STAT. § 1003.32(1)(k) (2021); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-731 (1977); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 158.4440(3) (requiring reporting of all incidents of corporal punishment);
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 28, Pt CXV § 1315(A) (2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-57(2) (2019);
MO. REV. STAT. §§ 160.261(1), (10), § 563.061 (2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-390.4(a),
(b) (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 844 (1963); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-260 (1962); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 49-6-4103 (2007); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. § 37.0011(b) (2011); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4-308 (1997). For the examples of states where no state law explicitly authorizes or prohibits corporal punishment, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-18(a) (2021)
(allowing the use of reasonable physical force to protect property from physical damage);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-2 (2018) (authorizing the use of reasonable and necessary
physical force for supervisory control over students). For the 28 states banning corporal
punishment, see ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 07.010(c) (1989); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.9(a)
(2015); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 11165.4 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 702 (2014); D.C. Mun.
Regs. tit. 5-E §§ 2401(12) (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1141 (2016); 105 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/24-24 (1995); IOWA CODE § 280.21(1) (2020); IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 281-103.3
(256B, 280) (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1141 (2016); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7
-306(b) (2019); MD. CODE REGS. 13A.08.01.11; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37G(a) (2000);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1312(3) (2018); MINN. STAT. § 121A.58 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 20-4-302(3) (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-295 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.4633(1) (2007);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:6 (2016) (does not explicitly mention corporal punishment);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-1 (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4.3(B) (2017); N.M. CODE R.
§ 6.11.2.10 (2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 19.5(a)(1) (2007); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 15.1-19-02(1) (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.31(A) (2021); OHIO ADMIN. CODE
3301-35-15(C)(3) (2021); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.250(9)(a) (2019); OR. ADMIN. R. 581-021-0060
(1990); 22 PA. CODE § 12.5(a) (2005); 200-20-30 R.I. CODE R. § 2.2(A)(6)(a) (LexisNexis
2022); VT. STAT. ANN. § 1161a(c) (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.1(A) (1995); WASH. REV.
CODE § 28A.150.300 (2006); W. VA. CODE § 18A-5-1(e); WIS. STAT. § 118.31 (1999). The District of Columbia also banned corporal punishment. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5-E, §§ 2401.12,
2403(2), 2403(3) (2002).
290. Gershoff, supra note 143, at 20.
291. Id. at 20.
292. Id.
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crimes.”293 The banning of corporal punishment in schools even lags
behind bans of corporal punishment of adults in U.S. prisons and
U.S. military training facilities, as well as bans in all states for
beating “an animal so long or hard that” it becomes injured.294 The
lag may evidence the influence of the tort teacher privilege.295 The
bans of corporal punishment of children in settings other than schools,
however, appears to reflect recognition that the practice is unnecessarily harmful and ineffective.296
No federal statute limits or prohibits school brutality, and no
federal statute regulates the methods of corporal punishment, seclusion, or restraint in school.297 Reflecting the fact that school discipline is regulated locally, state laws vary widely in whether and how
they define or limit corporal punishment, seclusion, and restraint.
Most states define corporal punishment as the infliction of physical
pain or the use of physical force for purposes of maintaining discipline or order within public schools.298 Some states, however, do not
define corporal punishment, leaving local school districts to define
it themselves.299
Adding to the complexity of local regulations affecting school
brutality, in states that permit corporal punishment, some large urban
school districts, such as the districts of Atlanta, Dallas, Houston,
Miami-Dade, Tucson, and Memphis, have banned corporal punishment.300 Despite the positive message sent by county bans on corporal punishment, local prosecutors loathe clashing with state law.301
Prosecutors have dropped criminal charges against abusive teachers
because they could not in good faith disagree with state law.302
293. Id.
294. Gershoff & Font, supra note 21, at 13.
295. See Gershoff, supra note 143, at 16.
296. Id. at 13.
297. Id. at 18.
298. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 563.061 (2014) (allowing the use of physical force by
a teacher against a minor to maintain “reasonable discipline in a school, class or other
group”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4103(a) (2007) (permitting any teacher or school principal
to use corporal punishment “to maintain discipline and order within the public schools”);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-57(2) (2019) (defining corporal punishment as “the reasonable
use of physical force or physical contact . . . to maintain discipline, to enforce a school
rule, for self-protection or for the protection of other students from disruptive students”);
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49001(a) (1977) (defining corporal punishment as the “willful infliction of . . . physical pain on a pupil”).
299. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-295 (1996).
300. Anderson, supra note 116; Gershoff, supra note 143, at 20.
301. See, e.g., David Ovalle & Colleen Wright, Aide hit autistic pupil in past but allowed
back into classroom, MIAMI HERALD (May 22, 2019, 6:30 PM), https://www.miamiherald
.com/news/local/education/article230359234.html [https://perma.cc/22ES-42G5].
302. See, e.g., id. (describing the dropping of a battery case against an abusive teacher
by prosecutors; the teacher continues to teach—her only punishment was a letter of
reprimand).
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Because different states and localities approach the regulation or
authorization of school corporal punishment in significantly different ways, corporal punishment law across states is a hodgepodge of
distinctly different definitions, limitations, and authorizations of the
practice.303
1. States that Ban Corporal Punishment in Schools
Some states with the strongest corporal punishment bans, such
as Pennsylvania, Virginia, and New York, also promote student safety
by prohibiting “aversive behavioral interventions,”304 which may include punishment for a manifestation of a student’s disability; “deprivation of basic human rights, such as withholding meals, water, or
fresh air”;305 denial of access to toilet facilities; verbal and mental
abuse; “treatment of a demeaning nature”; and/or electric shock.306
Most of the states that outlaw some forms of corporal punishment
still authorize the use of certain forms of force upon students or
allow the use of physical force in certain circumstances. For instance,
California prohibits public school employees from inflicting corporal
punishment, defined as the willful infliction of physical pain on a
pupil.307 However, California’s law excludes “reasonable and necessary” force to quell a disturbance threatening damage to property
from the definition of corporal punishment.308 Similarly, Alaska prohibits corporal punishment,309 but allows the use of “reasonable and
necessary physical restraint” to “maintain reasonable order in the
classroom” or to “protect property from serious damage.”310 North
Dakota prohibits corporal punishment, but allows the use of force
“to quell a verbal disturbance.”311 Hawaii’s law admonishes that “[n]o
physical punishment of any kind may be inflicted upon any pupil,”312
but it also allows a principal or teacher to use physical force to maintain reasonable discipline in a school or classroom.313
303. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
304. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 19.5(b) (2007).
305. 22 PA. CODE § 14.133(e) (2008).
306. See 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 20-750-30, 20-750-10 (2021) (prohibiting the use of
“aversive stimuli,” which means “interventions intended to induce pain or discomfort for
the purpose of punishing the student or eliminating or reducing maladaptive behaviors,
such as” verbal and mental abuse; forced exercise when the student’s behavior is related
to the student’s disability; and deprivation of necessities).
307. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49001 (1977).
308. Id. at § 49001(a).
309. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4 § 07.010(c) (1989).
310. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4 § 07.900 (1989).
311. N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-19-02(2)(b) (2009).
312. HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1141 (2016).
313. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 302A-1141, 703-309(2) (2016).
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Thus, at first glance, many states appear to have banned all
corporal punishment in schools, but the laws of these states usually
authorize the use of physical force against students in multiple
scenarios and even for traditional purposes, such as maintaining
discipline or order or quelling disturbances or disruptions.314 Courts
have relied upon such exceptions to reverse the convictions of school
personnel who have brutalized students.315 Therefore, while an explicit state law prohibition on corporal punishment sends the message
that school employees should avoid such punishment, the existence
of multiple exceptions to many prohibitions undermines efforts by
prosecutors to hold such employees accountable for school brutality.316 The exceptions thus challenge Ingraham’s assumption that
criminal proceedings will provide adequate remedies and deterrence
to excessive corporal punishment in schools.317
No states that ban school corporal punishment make suing
schools or school officials easier by explicitly providing a private
right of action for violations of the ban.318 Rather, some states that
ban school corporal punishment, such as Montana, limit the criminal
liability and amount of recovery that can be obtained if a person
violates the prohibition.319 The Montana statute establishes that a
school employee who unreasonably or unnecessarily uses corporal
punishment is guilty of a misdemeanor and cannot be fined more
than $500.320
2. States that Permit Corporal Punishment in Schools
States permitting corporal punishment tend to explicitly endow
educators with significant authority for maintaining control and
314. See, e.g., IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 281-103.2, 281-103.3, 281-103.4 (2021) (allowing
“reasonable and necessary force” to quell a disturbance or to move a disruptive pupil
from class and allowing reasonable “physical contact”).
315. See, e.g., State v. Hoover, 450 N.E.2d 710, 714, 716 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (reversing the conviction of a school administrator for criminal assault, the court relied on
a statutory exception to the ban on corporal punishment to add a new element to the crime
of assault that must be proven in school corporal punishment cases).
316. See, e.g., id.; Cleveland v. Pembroke, No. 2005-CRB-39185, 2006 WL 6846157 at
*1, 2, 4 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. June 21, 2006) (holding that an assistant principal was not
guilty of the crimes of menacing and assault because “Ohio law still recognizes some
degree of privilege to use force” and defendant did not use an excessive amount of force
while pushing a student and asking, “Do you want to fight me?”).
317. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) (“As long as the schools are
open to public scrutiny, there is no reason to believe that the common-law constraints
will not effectively remedy and deter excesses [in school corporal punishment].”).
318. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 20-20-40-15(c) (2020); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-302(7)
(1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53G-8-303(3) (2019).
319. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-302(7) (1991).
320. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-302(7) (1991).
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order.321 To illustrate, through its statutory law Mississippi requires
superintendents, principals, and teachers to “hold the[ir] pupils to
strict account for disorderly conduct at school, on the way to and from
school, on the playgrounds, and during recess.”322 Mississippi law also
requires local school boards to adopt “[p]olicies and procedures recognizing the teacher as the authority in classroom matters, and supporting that teacher in any decision in compliance with the written
discipline code of conduct.”323 Mississippi law explicitly establishes
“the right of the teacher to remove from the classroom any student
who, in the professional judgment of the teacher, is disrupting the
learning environment.”324 The law also specifically authorizes teachers to use physical force to deal with disruptive students.325 Similarly,
Missouri law requires and empowers its public school teachers to
end disorder and disruption by students.326
Most of the states permitting corporal punishment in public
schools also have statutes that explicitly provide immunity to school
personnel from civil liability and, less commonly, criminal liability
for administering such punishment in accordance with state law.327
Such immunity that is specific to corporal punishment adds to the
broad qualified or sovereign immunity that the state extends to all
government employees exercising ordinary care within the scope of
their employment.328
Usually, specific statutory immunity for school corporal punishment allows for a lower duty of care during the disciplining of students
than the duty of care described in the statute providing immunity
321. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 160.261(7) (2014) (authorizing all school district personnel “to hold every pupil strictly accountable for any disorderly conduct in school”);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-32-109.1(2)(a)(I)(D) (2021) (specifically authorizing the use
of physical force to deal with disruptive students); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-57(2) (2019)
(specifically authorizing the use of physical force to deal with disruptive students).
322. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-9-69 (1954) (emphasis added).
323. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-55(d) (2004) (emphasis added).
324. Id.
325. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-57(2) (2019).
326. Id.; MO. REV. STAT. § 160.261(7) (2014).
327. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-732 (1964) (providing immunity from civil and
criminal liability); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-308 (1997) (providing immunity from civil and
criminal liability); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-57(2) (2019) (providing immunity from civil
liability); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(1)(b) (2016); MO.REV.STAT. § 160.261(10) (2014); ALA.
CODE § 16-1-24.1 (1994) (providing immunity from civil liability); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-17
-112 (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1312(5) (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-390.3(c)
(2011) (protecting from civil liability and stating that the “burden of proof is on the claimant
to show that the amount of force used was not reasonable”). But see TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 49-6-4404(b) (1980) (stating explicitly that “[i]n any case in which the [corporal] punishment is excessive,” pupils “have the same civil and criminal remedies as any other pupil
in the public schools.”).
328. Cf. MO. REV. STAT. § 537.610 (2009); MO. REV. STAT. § 160.261(10) (2021).
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to all governmental employees.329 To illustrate, ordinarily, in Mississippi, government employees are immune from civil liability if they
are exercising ordinary care within the course and scope of their
governmental employment, but when a teacher or principal is disciplining a child, they will not be liable unless they act “in bad faith
or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting a wanton and
willful disregard of human rights or safety.”330
Qualified immunity for school personnel and police officers,
whether it is statutory or based upon state or federal case law, and
statutory immunity for school personnel that is specific to school
corporal punishment are significant barriers for parents and children who seek justice after an incident of school brutality. Appellate
courts have prevented or reversed the imposition of civil or criminal
liability upon many school personnel and school resource officers by
holding that their actions fall within the scope of qualified or specific statutory immunity.331 In fact, attorneys representing children
and parents have found that the action of a governmental agent
must fall “outside the scope of the actor’s employment to withstand
a governmental immunity defense.”332
The death of George Floyd has intensified calls for the end of
qualified immunity, as a growing chorus of criticism from lawyers,
legal scholars, civil rights groups, politicians, and even judges who
assert that such immunity is unjust because it has become “a nearly
329. See, e.g., Pigford v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 910 So. 2d 575, 578–80 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2005).
330. See id. at 579–80 (holding that a teacher’s disciplining of a child was protected
by the specific statutory immunity regarding school discipline of children).
331. See, e.g., Littleton v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1070, 1072–73, 1080 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
(dismissing criminal charges based on statutory qualified immunity after a teacher bound
a child with autism to a Rifton chair and tipped him backward for several minutes);
Barocas v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1256, 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (reversing the criminal
conviction of a teacher who flicked the tongue of a child with Down syndrome, causing
the child to wail, based on qualified immunity “for reasonably necessary disciplinary
acts”); Pigford, 910 So. 2d at 576, 578–80 (holding that sovereign immunity protects school
personnel from a negligence action because their actions did not constitute “willful or
wanton conduct” even when an autistic student sustained bruises as a result of their
attempts to restrain the student during an anxiety attack); Ex rel. E.W. v. Dolgos, 884
F.3d 172, 184, 186–87 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that the handcuffing of a calm, 10-year-old
child three days after the child had an altercation with another child was unreasonable
and violated the child’s Fourth Amendment rights, but qualified immunity applies
because the officer did not have sufficient notice that her conduct was unlawful, so
summary judgment was granted); C.N. v. Willmar Pub. Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 347,
591 F.3d 624, 627, 628, 632 (8th Cir. 2010) (defendants held to be entitled to qualified
immunity after allegedly using restraints and seclusion on developmentally delayed
child); J.H. ex rel. J.P. v. Bernalillo Cnty., 61 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1093–94 (D.N.M. 2014)
(holding that defendant is entitled to qualified immunity after allegedly arresting an
eleven-year-old girl, handcuffing her, and transporting her to a juvenile detention center).
332. See, e.g., Ostrander & Halpert, supra note 248, at 14.
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failsafe tool to let police brutality go unpunished and deny victims
their constitutional rights.”333 Indeed, qualified immunity and specific
statutory indemnification of governmental agents who inflict school
brutality must be reduced significantly, if not eliminated, if children
are to enjoy their right at school to be free from unjustified intrusions
on their personal security.334
Another barrier to justice is statutory exclusion of school brutality
from definitions of child abuse. Two states, Missouri and Mississippi,
permit corporal punishment in schools and have statutes that state
that reasonably administered corporal punishment in school does
not constitute child abuse.335 Missouri law even declares that the
state child protective services agency shall not have jurisdiction over
or investigate any report of alleged child abuse related to the use of
“reasonable force to protect persons or property” by school district
personnel or any spanking administered in a “reasonable manner”
by such personnel.336
Some states that authorize corporal punishment in schools impose certain requirements in attempts to make the practice safer
and more deliberate. For instance, Florida requires the presence of
another adult, and the student must be informed of the reason for
the punishment.337 Georgia prohibits punishment that is “excessive
or unduly severe” or that is the “first line of punishment for misbehavior,” unless the punishment is for acts of misconduct that are “so
antisocial or disruptive in nature as to shock the conscience.”338
Georgia also allows parents to protect their child from corporal punishment by filing with a school principal a statement from a doctor
indicating that corporal punishment is detrimental to a child’s mental
or emotional stability.339 North Carolina does not permit corporal
333. Andrew Chung, Lawrence Hurley, Jackie Botts, Andrea Januta & Guillermo
Gomez, For cops who kill, special Supreme Court protection, REUTERS (May 8, 2020, 12:00
PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunity-scotus
[https://perma.cc/45TE-YWMX]; see Editorial, How the Supreme Court Lets Cops Get Away
With Murder (May 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/opinion/Minneapolis
-police-George-Floyd.html [https://perma.cc/G6LD-MJ9Z] (asserting that U.S. Supreme
Court case law regarding qualified immunity provides police officers with “nearly
limitless immunity from prosecution for actions taken while on the job.”).
334. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673–74 (1977); Ronnie Gipson, Opinion, Why
qualified immunity privilege is bad public policy and must be eliminated, COMMERCIAL
APPEAL (May 12, 2021, 4:00 PM), https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/opinion/2021
/05/12/why-qualified-immunity-privilege-should-eliminated/5056753001 [https://perma
.cc/WF5U-8M3W] (“The qualified immunity privilege is both bad law and bad public policy
and it must be eliminated.”).
335. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-57(2) (2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 160.261(10) (2014).
336. MO. REV. STAT. § 160.261(10) (2014).
337. FLA. STAT. § 1002.20(4)(c)(1) (2021).
338. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-2-731(1)–(2) (1977).
339. Id. at § 20-2-731(5).

662

WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.

[Vol. 28:617

punishment in a classroom with other students present.340 Arkansas
law prohibits the use of “corporal punishment on a child who is intellectually disabled, non-ambulatory, nonverbal, or autistic.”341
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennessee do not permit corporal punishment to be administered upon any student with a disability who
is receiving special education.342 Despite the good intentions manifested in these requirements, compliance with them is questionable;
Louisiana employees hit special education students nearly 100 times
in 2017–18.343
Some states, such as Texas and North Carolina, allow parents
to opt out of the corporal punishment of their child at school by
signing a statement prohibiting the use of such punishment.344 The
legal importance of such signed statements is unclear, however, given
that the U.S. Supreme Court held in Ingraham v. Wright that parental
consent to corporal punishment is not constitutionally required, and
the authority that teachers have to corporally punish students derives from state compulsory education laws rather than the delegation
of parental authority to schools.345 Such conclusions, however, may
not matter much to state courts that perceive the teacher privilege
to corporally punish as deriving primarily from school employees
standing in loco parentis.346
Demonstrating the subjugation of children’s rights, most of the
states that permit adults to hit children in schools make it a serious,
reportable offense for children to hit adults or other children in the
same schools.347 For instance, Mississippi statutory law requires
educators to notify law enforcement officials about any “violent act”
on educational property, but the meaning of “act” does not include
violence committed by adults.348 Tennessee similarly requires every
teacher having knowledge of an assault or battery when “committed
by a student” on school property to report such action to the principal
340. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-390.4(b)(1) (2011).
341. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-503(b)(3)(A) (2019).
342. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-57(3) (2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.1(B)(2) (2017);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4103(b) (2007).
343. See Keierleber, supra note 19.
344. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.0011(c) (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C -390.4(b)(6)
(2011).
345. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 n.22 (1977); Baker v. Owen, 395 F.
Supp. 294, 301 (M.D.N.C. 1975), aff’d, 423 U.S. 907 (1975) (holding that the wishes of a
parent cannot be permitted to restrict school officials’ discretion in deciding the “legitimate”
and “essential” purpose of maintaining discipline at school).
346. See, e.g., Morris v. State, 228 So. 3d 670, 672 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
347. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-57 (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-29 (2022).
348. See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-11-57(1) (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. 37-11-29(1) (2022);
see also MO. REV. STAT. § 160.261(2) (2014) (requiring the reporting of first- and seconddegree assault and felonious restraint when committed by students, but not requiring
the same when committed by adults).
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of the school, who is required to report it to the local police department.349 Some states that permit corporal punishment in schools have
violence prevention programs that encourage nonviolent resolution
of conflicts, but such programs do not focus on preventing violence by
educators upon children.350 Some states permitting school corporal
punishment even have initiatives to make schools trauma-informed.351
The policy contradictions evident in these state laws highlight desensitization to school brutality and the subordination of children’s
rights to be safe from violence by adults at school.
D. State Statutes on Seclusion and Restraint
Please someone respond to me. . . . I’m sorry I
ripped the paper. I overreacted. . . . Please just let
me out. Is anyone out there?
—A child in seclusion in Effingham, Illinois, 2018352
I’d rather die. You’re torturing me!
—A child in seclusion in Central School,
Springfield, Illinois, 2018353
Having a law that allows schools to do something
that is so traumatic and dangerous to students
without having some sort of meaningful oversight
and monitoring is really, really troubling . . . .
—Zena Naiditch354
Almost all states restrict the use of seclusion or restraint in
public schools in some way, and state regulation of these practices,
which is often established through promulgation of administrative
regulations by state departments of education, is increasing quickly.355
349. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4301(a) (2007).
350. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 161.650(1) (2017).
351. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. §§ 161.1050 (2017); MO. REV. STAT. 161.1055 (2016)
(establishing the “Trauma-Informed Schools Initiative” and the “Trauma-Informed Schools
Pilot Program”).
352. Richards et al., supra note 85.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. See Butler, supra note 54 (showing how quickly laws regarding seclusion and
restraint changed in the last 10 years); NAT’L CTR. LEARNING ENV’T, supra note 162 (last
visited Apr. 7, 2022) (allowing visitors to review the laws regarding seclusion and restraint for each state); see, e.g., D.C. Off. of the State Superintendent of Educ., Notice of
Final Rulemaking for District of Columbia Municipal Regulations (DCMR), Title 5,
Chapter 30: Special Education (Nov. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Notice of Final Rulemaking],
https://osse.dc.gov/publication/notice-final-rulemaking-district-columbia-municipal-regu
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Currently, only three states, Idaho, Nebraska, and South Carolina,
and the District of Columbia have no state statutory or regulatory
laws restricting the use of seclusion or restraints in public schools.356
Seven states ban seclusion in public schools.357 Four of those
states ban seclusion and only allow restraint when the student is in
imminent danger of physically harming self or others.358 Twenty-one
states ban restraint and seclusion except when the student is in
imminent danger of physically harming self or others.359 Some states
have regulations on seclusion or restraint, but they only apply in
certain situations.360 For instance, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nevada,
lations-dcmr-title-5-chapter-3-0 [https://perma.cc/NZ3Z-KYAT] (providing notice of proposed regulations of seclusion and restraint).
356. See NAT’L CTR. LEARNING ENV’T, supra note 162; 92 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 10-011.01E
(2011) (stating that “each school system has a seclusion and restraints policy approved
by the school board or local governing body”); Brad Meurrens & Elliott Bulling, At Risk
with Only Guidance for Protection: Restraint and Seclusion Policy for Nebraska Students,
DISABILITY RTS. NEBRASKA 7 (2014), http://www.disabilityrightsnebraska.org/file_down
load/f7ff74f0-ac6b-46c0-9966-eb8223e930b7 [https://perma.cc/4SCM-5KHY]. But cf. MO.
REV. STAT. § 160.263(4)(1) (2021) (providing very little state regulation of seclusion and
restraint); MONT.CODE ANN. § 20-4-302(4)(a), (7), (8) (1991); MONT.ADMIN.R. 10.16.3346(2)
(2015) (providing little state regulation of seclusion and restraint). The District of Columbia
is in the process of establishing administrative regulations regarding the seclusion and
restraint of children with disabilities. See Notice of Final Rulemaking, supra note 355.
357. See ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-3-1-.02(2)(I) (2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14,
§ 4112F(b)(1)(b) (2018) (noting that the prohibition can be waived); GA. COMP. R. & REGS.
160-5-1-.35(2)(a) (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1141.3 (2016); 603 MASS. CODE REGS.
46.03(1)(a); 200-20-30 R.I. CODE R. § 2.2(20)(b) (LexisNexis 2022); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 37.0021(c) (2021).
358. ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. § 290-3-1-.02(2) (2021); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 160-5-1-.35(1)(e),
(2)(e) (2010); 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 46.03(1)(a), 46.03(1)(c); 200-20-30 R.I. CODE R.
§§ 2.2(20)(b), 2.5(A), 2.4(A) (LexisNexis 2022).
359. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.125(b) (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-105(A)
(2015); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49005.4 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-20-103(1) (2017); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 10-236b(b), (d)(1) (2018); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 1.285 (2021); IND. CODE
§§ 20-20-40-13(a)(2)(B), (E) (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6153(a) (2013); 704 KY. ADMIN.
REGS. 7:160(4)(2) (2021), 7:160(3)(3) (2019); LA.STAT.ANN. §§ 17:416.21(B)(1), (C)(1) (2017);
MD. CODE REGS. 13A.08.04.05(A)(1), (B)(1) (2022); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1307b(d), (f),
(g), (I), (j), (k) (2018); MINN. STAT. §§ 125A.0941(b), (c), (g) (2020); MINN. STAT. §§ 125A
.0942(3)(a) (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 126-U:5(I)(II) (2021), 126-U5-a(I) (2014);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4.12(A) (2021); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-35-15(D)(2), (E)(1) (2021);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 339.291(2)(a), (b) (2019); 7-1 VT. CODE R. §§ 12:4502.1, 12:4502.2
(2021); 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-671-650(1) (2015); 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-671-660(B)
(2015); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-172A-02110 (2016); WIS. STAT. §§ 118.305(2)(a), (3)(a)
(2020). But see ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 1.285 (2021) (excluding from the definition of
restraint “momentary periods of physical restriction” to remove a disruptive student);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6152(g) (2016); 7-1 VT. CODE R. § 12:4500.3(7)(a)(ii) (2021) (excluding
from the definition of physical restraint momentary periods of physical restriction to remove a disruptive student); WIS. STAT. § 118.31(3)(e) (1999) (allowing an agent of a school
board to use reasonable and “necessary force to remove a disruptive pupil from school
premises . . . or from school-sponsored activities”).
360. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.21 (2017).
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New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee regulate
seclusion and/or restraint only when these practices are used with
children receiving special education.361
A few states explicitly authorize the seclusion or restraint of
students in nonemergency circumstances, meaning that they authorize seclusion or restraint when a student is not in imminent danger
of seriously physically harming themself or others.362 For instance,
some states permit the seclusion or restraint of children when they
are disruptive363 or when they are being destructive to property.364
North Carolina and Montana permit restraint to maintain order.365
Some state statutes explicitly authorize the application of physical
force in order to place students in seclusion.366
Some states explicitly limit civil or criminal liability for restraint
or seclusion that complies with state law.367 Unusually, Utah law
states that “any school or individual” who “cooperates in an investigation by a school or authorized public agency concerning a violation”
of regulations of physical restraint is “immune from any civil or
criminal liability that might otherwise result by reason of those actions.”368 Indiana regulations state that public school personnel have
qualified immunity if their action regarding seclusion and restraint
“is taken in good faith and is reasonable.”369 Montana law establishes
that a school district employee who uses physical restraint that is
more than “reasonable or necessary, the person is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction of the misdemeanor . . . shall be fined
not . . . more than $500.”370 Montana law also explicitly states that
“a defendant in an action brought under [the law regulating physical restraint] may assert as an affirmative defense that the use of
physical restraint was reasonable or necessary,” and the trier of fact
361. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-10-1302(4) (2008); LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.21(B)(1)
(2017); MINN. STAT. § 125A.0942(3)(a) (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.499 (2015); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:46-13.5(a)(1), 18A:46-13.6(a)(1) (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-01
.2–09 (2021); 22 PA. CODE § 14.133(c) (2008).
362. See, e.g., 005-18 ARK. CODE § 20.03(1) (2021).
363. See, e.g., 005-18 ARK. CODE R. § 20.03(1) (2021) (allowing seclusion for “severely
disruptive” behavior); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-302(4)(a)(I), (4)(v) (1991).
364. 005-18 ARK. CODE R. § 20-20.03.1 (2021); see KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 91-42.2(a)
(2017); 7-38 MISS. CODE R. § 38.13(4)(a)(ii) (2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-302(4)(a)(vi)
(1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-391.1(c)(1)(g) (2011); UTAH ADMIN. CODE R. 277-609
-4(3)(i)(B) (LexisNexis 2021).
365. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-302(4)(a)(v) (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-391
.1(c)(1)(b), (e)(1)(b) (2011).
366. See, e.g., 005-18 ARK. CODE R. § 20-20.03.3 (2021).
367. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 20-20-40-15(c) (2020).
368. UTAH CODE ANN. § 53G-8-303(3) (2019).
369. IND. CODE § 20-20-40-15(c) (2020).
370. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-302(7) (1991).
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must then determine whether the restraint was reasonable or necessary.371 Iowa’s regulations state that regulations of restraint and
seclusion do not limit or eliminate any immunity conferred to governmental employees.372 A few states, such as Alabama, Indiana, and
North Carolina, have laws that specify that regulations of seclusion
and restraint do not create a criminal offense or a private cause of
action against a school official.373
On the other hand, many states have taken leadership to make
restraint and seclusion safer.374 Most states require documentation
and reporting about each use of restraint or seclusion.375 Most states
require notification about a seclusion or restraint to a parent shortly
after the practice is applied.376 Kansas law explicitly gives parents
a right to request a meeting to debrief the incident for purposes of
preventing future incidents.377 Some states also require governmental review of reports of seclusion and restraint incidents for purposes of minimizing the use of these practices.378
For instance, Virginia requires review of the use of restraint or
seclusion, “particularly when there is repeated use for an individual
371. Id. at § 20-4-302(8).
372. IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 281-103.7(4) (256B,280) (2021).
373. ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-3-1-.02(2)(xiii) (2021); IND. CODE § 20-20-40-15(b) (2020);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391.1(k) (2011).
374. See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-3-1-.02(2)(vii)(V) (2021) (requiring the reporting
of use of restraint or seclusion).
375. See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-3-1-.02(2)(vii)(V) (2021); ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.33
.125(a)(3), (d), (f) (2014); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 06.175 (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15-105(D) (2015); 005-18 ARK. CODE R. § 20-20.04.7 (2021); CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 49006(a) (2021); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 22-32-147(3)(a), 26-20-106(1) (2017); FLA. STAT.
§ 1003.573(7) (2021); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-20.33(h) (2021); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/34-18.20(h) (2021); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 281-103.7(5) (2021); 704 KY. ADMIN. REGS.
7:160(5) (2019); 05-071-101 ME. CODE R. § 33.8(1) (2022); 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 46.06(8);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1307d (2018); 206-42 WYO. CODE R. § 7(c) (2017).
376. See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE R. 290-3-1-.02(2)(vii)(II) (2021) (requiring notification
about restraint within one day); ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.120(b) (2014) (requiring same-day
notification of a restraint or seclusion); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-105(D) (2015) (requiring
same-day notification of a restraint or seclusion); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56521 (2013) (applying to special education students); FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(7)(c) (2021) (requiring notification by end of day); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 160-5-1-.35(2)(g)(2) (2010) (requiring notification
within one school day); HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1141.4(c) (2016); IND. CODE § 20-20-40
-13(a)(2)(H) (2020); IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 281-103.7(1)(e)(b) (2021) (“as soon as practicable
after the situation is under control, but no later than one hour after the incident or the
end of the school day, whichever occurs first”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6154(a)(1) (2016);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.21(I)(1) (2017) (applying to students with “exceptionalities”); 05
-071-101 ME. CODE R. § 33.7(2)(A) (2022); 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 46.06(3).
377. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6155(a) (2015).
378. ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.33.125(a)(2), (e) (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-105(D)(3)
(2015); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 22-32-147(3)(b), 26-20-107 (2017); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 160
-5-1-.35(2)(g)(5) (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 302A-1141.4(h), (j) (2016); 05-071-101 ME.
CODE R. § 33.10(1) (2022); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1307f(b) (2018); cf. FLA. STAT. § 1003
.573(8) (2021) (requiring monitoring of seclusion and restraint).
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child, multiple uses within the same classroom, or multiple uses by
the same individual.”379 Such review may, if appropriate, require a
revision of behavioral strategies and the development of positive
behavioral strategies.380 If a school has used restraint or seclusion on
a student, Virginia requires the school to develop a plan, “in consultation with the parent, for (i) teaching and supporting more appropriate behavior and (ii) determining positive methods to prevent
behavioral escalations.”381
Similarly, for each incident of physical restraint or seclusion,
Maine requires review of the incident to determine how to prevent
future incidents, including a review with the student who was involved.382 No state has a statute establishing penalties for inaccurate
or untimely reporting, however.383
Many states generally require that staff receive training before
they restrain a child,384 while many other states require that school
staff be trained on the use of physical restraint before or after applying the practice.385
Most states regulate the way in which a child can be restrained
at school.386 For instance, most states prohibit the use of prone restraints or restraints that impede a child’s ability to breathe.387
Maine prohibits restraint that “relies on pain for control,” such as
“joint hyperextension, excessive force, unsupported take-down (e.g.
tackle), the use of any physical structure (e.g. wall, railing or post),
379. 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-671-660(B)(1) (2015).
380. Id.
381. Id. at § 20-671-660(B)(2).
382. 05-071-33 ME. CODE R. § 9(1)(A) (2021).
383. See NAT’L CTR. LEARNING ENV’T, supra note 162.
384. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.125(b)(4) (2014); ARIZ.REV.STAT.ANN. § 15-105(B)(3)
(2015); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-20.33(c) (2021); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/34-18.20(c)
(2021); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 281-103.7(256B,280)(2)(a)(1) (2021); MD. CODE REGS. 13A
.08.04.05(A)(1)(c), (B)(5); 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 46.05(1); 200-20-30 R.I. CODE R. § 2.6(A)
(LexisNexis 2021).
385. See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-3-1-.02(2)(vii)(I) (2021); 005-18 ARK. CODE R.
§ 20.4(10) (2021) (requiring personnel involved in implementing behavioral management
procedures to be adequately trained and supervised); COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-20-105(1)
(2017); GA.COMP.R.&REGS. 160-5-1-.35(2)(h) (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1141.4(d)(1),
(g) (2016); IND. CODE § 20-20-40-13(2)(J) (2020); 513 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-2-6(a) (2020);
704 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 7:160(6)(1)(a) (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1307g(a) (2018);
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 89.1053(d)(1)–(4) (2015); W. VA. CODE R. § 126-99-5(5).
386. See NAT’L CTR. LEARNING ENV’T, supra note 162.
387. See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-3-1-.02(2)(ii) (2021); ALASKA STAT. § 14.33
.125(c)(3) (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-105(B)(4) (2015); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49005
.8(a)(3)–(5) (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-20-104(1)(b) (2009); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 160
-5-1-.35(1)(d) (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1141.4(b) (2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72
-6153(f)(1) (2016); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 3301-35-15(D)(2)(b) (2021); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 13-32-20(2) (2018); MINN. STAT. § 125A.0942(4)(9) (2020) (applying to children with
disabilities).
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punching and hitting.”388 Multiple states require the end of a restraint
when the student is no longer in imminent danger of physically harming themselves or others.389 Colorado requires release from a restraint within fifteen minutes;390 Maryland requires release within
thirty minutes.391 Alaska requires the continuous monitoring of a restrained student in face-to-face contact.392 Alabama, Georgia, Vermont,
and Massachusetts require the end of a restraint when a student is observed to be in severe distress.393 California requires educational
providers to “use the least number of restraint points” and “afford . . .
pupils who are restrained the least restrictive alternative and the
maximum freedom of movement.”394
Almost all of the states that regulate restraint prohibit the use
of mechanical restraint, which is the use of any device or material
attached to or adjacent to a student’s body that is intended to restrict
the normal freedom of movement and which cannot easily be removed
by a student.395 Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North
Carolina, and Utah, however, permit the use of mechanical restraints,
such as handcuffs, by law enforcement officers.396 Almost all of the
states that regulate restraint also prohibit the use of chemical restraint, which is the use of any medication that controls violent physical behavior or restricts the student’s freedom of movement that is
not a prescribed treatment for the student’s medical condition.397
Regarding regulation of the purpose of restraint, multiple states
explicitly prohibit the use of restraint for disciplinary purposes.398
388. See 05-071-33 ME. CODE R. § 6(2)(D) (2022).
389. E.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-3-1.02(2)(vi) (2021); ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.125(b)(1)
(2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-105(B)(2) (2015); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 160-5-1
-.35(2)(f) (2010).
390. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-20-104(4) (2009).
391. See MD. CODE REGS. 13A.08.04.05(a)(1)(e)(ii).
392. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.125(b)(3) (2014); accord ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15
-105(A) (2015) (requiring continuous visual observation and monitoring during a
restraint or seclusion).
393. See ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-3-1-.02(2)(vi) (2021); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 160-5-1
-.35(2)(f) (2010); 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 46.05(5)(b); 7-1 VT. CODE R. § 12:4502.5(a) (2019).
394. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49005.8(a)(4)–(5), (c) (2019).
395. See ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-3-1-.02(1)(f)(1)(ii), (2)(iii) (2021) (defining mechanical
restraint); see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 14.33.125(c)(2) (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-20
-111(1) (2017); FLA. STAT. § 1003.573(3)(a) (2021); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 160-5-1-.35(2)(c)
(2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1307b(f) (2018).
396. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 91-42-2(g)(6) (2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.21(A)(2)(b)(ii)
(2017); 05-071-33 ME. CODE R. § 6(5) (2022); 7-38 MISS. CODE R. § 38.13(4)(d) (2016); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 115C-391.1(c)(4) (2011); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 277-609-4(3)(v)(C) (LexisNexis 2021).
397. See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-3-1-02(2)(iv) (2021); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 14.33
.125(c)(1) (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-20-111(1) (2017); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 160-5-1
-.35(2)(d) (2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1307b(g) (2018).
398. See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 290-3-1.02(2)(v) (2021); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49005.
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For instance, Virginia prohibits physical restraint or seclusion for
“disciplinary reasons, as a punishment or retaliation, or for staff’s
convenience.”399 Maine prohibits the use of restraint “as a therapeutic or educational intervention.”400
Regarding whether schools adjust restraint practices in response
to parental input or a child’s special needs, Washington prohibits
restraint unless it is authorized in advance by the child’s parent.401
Kansas prohibits the use of restraint or seclusion when a parent has
provided written documentation of “a medical condition that could
put the student in mental or physical danger” as a result of the intervention.402 Kentucky prohibits restraint if school personnel know
that it is “contraindicated based on the student’s disability, health
care needs, or medical or psychiatric condition.”403 Meanwhile, research on trauma shows that restraint should be contraindicated for
every child.404
To promote the safety of seclusion, several states require the
continuous monitoring of a student who is in seclusion.405 Some states
provide limits to the number of minutes that a student can remain
in seclusion.406 Multiple states, including Arkansas, regulate the dimensions, lighting, ventilation, and locking of seclusion rooms.407
Many states prohibit secluding children in locked rooms.408 Illinois
prohibits the confinement of students in a closet or box.409 Wisconsin
requires that the seclusion area be “free of objects or fixtures that
may injure the pupil.”410
8(a)(1) (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-20-103(1.5)(a) (2021); 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-671
-660(B)(3) (2015); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 160-5-1-.35(2)(e)(1)(i) (2010); ILL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 23, § 1.285 (2021); 05-071-33 ME. CODE R. § 5(2)(A) (2022); 7-38 MISS. CODE R. § 38
.13(2) (2016); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. 126-U:5-a(I) (2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391
.1(c)(3) (2011).
399. 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-671-660(B)(3) (2015).
400. 05-071-33 ME. CODE R. § 6(2)(E) (2022).
401. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.100 (1986).
402. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6153(b) (2016).
403. 704 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 7:160(3)(2)(f) (2019).
404. See Sege et al., supra note 124, at 4, 6 (indicating that corporal punishment can
be an adverse childhood experience).
405. E.g., 005-18 ARK. CODE R. § 20-20.03 (2021); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49005.8(b) (2019);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1307h(e) (2018).
406. E.g., 005-18 ARK. CODE R. § 20-20.04 (1)(A–C) (2021); MD. CODE REGS. 13A.08
.04.05(B)(6)(c); UTAH CODE ANN. § 277-609-5(7) (LexisNexis 2021).
407. E.g., 005-18 ARK. CODE R. § 20.04 (2021); IOWA ADMIN. CODE R. 281-103
.9(256B,280) (2), (6), (7), (12) (2021).
408. E.g., 005-18 ARK. CODE R. § 20.9(6) (2021); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8,
§ 200.22(c)(1)(i) (2014); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 277-609-5(5)(c) (LexisNexis 2021); 8 VA.
ADMIN. CODE § 20-671-660(B)(7) (2015).
409. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-20.33(d)(2) (2021).
410. WIS. STAT. § 118.305(2)(c) (2020).
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No state laws make it illegal to seclude or restrain a child multiple times in a year or make it harder to seclude or restrain children
who are young, such as six years old.411 Thus, individual children
have been secluded almost 100 times in a single school year and restrained 745 times over seven years.412 However, in a few states, such
as Connecticut and Oregon, if restraint or seclusion is used on a
student a certain number of times, such as five incidents in a school
year, state law requires holding a meeting, including the parent of
the student, for purposes of creating a behavioral intervention plan.413
Colorado, Kansas, and Kentucky provide an administrative private right of action for parents to formally complain about the use
of restraint or seclusion to a hearing officer or local school board.414
The filing of a complaint in Colorado requires the local school board
to investigate the allegations of the complaint and make a formal
determination about whether the law was violated.415 The remedies
provided by statute are not monetary; they are generally confined
to corrective action by schools to become more compliant with the
law.416 Other states, such as Maine and New Hampshire, have a less
formal complaint process in which parent complaints may trigger
investigation and the development of a corrective action plan.417
Remarkably, when a restraint or seclusion involves serious injury
in New Hampshire, the complaint process may require a state
investigator to refer complainant’s allegations to law enforcement
for investigation.418
Uniquely, California codified students’ “inalienable right to attend classes on school campuses that are safe, secure, and peaceful”419
and established that students have “the right to be free from the use
411. See NAT’L CTR. LEARNING ENV’T, supra note 162.
412. See Mary T. March, Parents Sue Fairfax Schools Over Alleged Student Seclusion,
Discrimination, NPR (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.npr.org/local/305/2019/10/09/768593229
/parents-sue-fairfax-schools-over-alleged-student-seclusion-discrimination [https://perma
.cc/T6WC-D2KV] (describing a child who had been secluded almost 100 times in a single
school year).
413. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-236b(g) (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.294(5) (2013);
05-071-33 ME. CODE R. § 9(2)(B)(1) (2022).
414. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-147(4) (2017); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6153(g)(2)(A)–(D)
(2016); 704 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 7:160(2)(f) (2019).
415. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-147(4) (2017); cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6153(g)(2)(B)
(2016).
416. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6153(g)(2)(C) (2016); 704 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 7:160(2)(f)
(2019); cf. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-147(4) (2017).
417. See 05-071-33 ME. CODE R. § 11 (2022); see also N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. EDUC.
1203.01–.03 (2021); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.303 (2013); 7-1 VT. CODE R. §§ 12:4507.1(a),
12:4508 (2021).
418. N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. EDUC. 1203.03(a)(1) (2021).
419. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 32261(a) (2012).
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of seclusion and behavioral restraints of any form imposed as a
means of coercion, discipline, convenience, or retaliation by staff.”420
Many states began regulating school seclusion or restraint in
response to the death of a child.421 While such incremental change
is positive, the nation, as a whole, has learned enough about school
brutality practices to now outlaw them across all states.
The above survey of state statutory and regulatory law regarding corporal punishment, seclusion, and restraint reveals that state
lawmakers are generally more willing to restrict seclusion and
restraint than corporal punishment.422 This fact is likely due to the
continued influence of the colonial teacher privilege to corporally
punish students, as well as the fact that many states’ regulations of
seclusion and restraint were promulgated by state departments of
education rather than legislated by elected officials.423 Policymakers
at state departments of education may be more attuned to scientific
evidence regarding the impacts of the use of physical force upon
children than elected officials, who may be more attuned to popular
opinion regarding corporal punishment.424 News reporters and child
advocates may also have been more successful in influencing public
opinion about seclusion and restraint than they have been regarding
corporal punishment.425
Regardless of the cause, to prevent school brutality, a state’s
school corporal punishment, seclusion, and restraint laws must consistently prohibit the use of force upon children. Any state law that
permits the use of any form of physical force upon schoolchildren
opens the door to their physical abuse. More specifically, tight restrictions on school seclusion and restraint combined with relaxed
420. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49005.2 (2019).
421. See SECLUSIONS & RESTRAINTS, supra note 81, at 10–11, 14–15 (describing the
outlawing of particular physical discipline practices following the deaths of children in
two states).
422. See infra Section D.
423. See Martin Gershman, California’s Schoolhouse Child Abuse: New Law Would
Stop Student Beatings, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 31, 1986), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la
-xpm-1986-08-31-op-15230-story.html [https://perma.cc/U3WP-VUL9]; NAT’L CTR. LEARNING ENV’T, supra note 162.
424. See Caitlin Stein, Accountability and Transparency in Public Administration, AM.
SOC’Y PUB. ADMIN. (Mar. 19, 2019), https://patimes.org/accountability-and-transparency
-in-public-administration [https://perma.cc/WD5B-NYN7]; Sege et al., supra note 124,
at 1, 4, 6 (indicating that corporal punishment can be an adverse childhood experience);
Emily Cuddy & Richard Reeves, Hitting kids: American parenting and physical punishment, BROOKINGS (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/research/hitting-kids-ameri
can-parenting-and-physical-punishment [https://perma.cc/TR5M-YSSU].
425. Compare Cuddy & Reeves, supra note 424, with Allison Norlian, Parents, advocates
question seclusion and restraint guidelines, NBC (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.nbc12.com
/story/33427804/parents-advocates-question-seclusion-and-restraint-guidelines [https://
perma.cc/BJJ5-N6U9].
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restrictions on school corporal punishment create ambiguities in the
law that facilitate school brutality.
Wisconsin law is an illustrative example. Wisconsin law prohibits the use of restraint or seclusion unless a “pupil’s behavior presents a clear, present, and imminent risk to the physical safety of the
pupil or others and it is the least restrictive intervention feasible.”426
Wisconsin law also prohibits corporal punishment in schools.427 Confusingly, however, the prohibition of school corporal punishment has
multiple exceptions, including authorizing school personnel to use
“reasonable and necessary force” to remove a disruptive pupil from
school premises, quell a disturbance, and protect property.428
Another exception is using “reasonable physical contact designed
to maintain order and control.”429 Not only do these exceptions undermine the prohibition on corporal punishment, they also make uncertain the otherwise strong restrictions on seclusion and restraint.
Such weaknesses in the law provide unclear guidance to school employees regarding the level of force they can use with students, and
school employees can effectively shield themselves from criminal
and civil liability by pointing to the plain language of the exceptions.
E. State Statutes Regarding Police in Schools
Only six states—California, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Texas—have statutes or regulations that function to reduce
the likelihood of school brutality by law enforcement officers.430
Indiana and Texas require SROs to comply with state laws regarding seclusion and restraint that apply to teachers.431 For instance,
Indiana requires SROs to comply with the prohibition against seclusion and restraint in schools unless the student’s behavior poses
imminent risk of injury to self or others and other less restrictive
interventions are ineffective.432
426. WIS. STAT. § 118.305(2)(a) (2020).
427. WIS. STAT. § 118.31(2) (1999).
428. WIS. STAT. § 118.31(3)(a), (d), (e) (1999).
429. Id. at § 118.31(3)(h).
430. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 56521.2 (2013); 513 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-2-4 (2020); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 72-6153 (2016); 704 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 7:160 (2019); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 37.0021 (2021).
431. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 37.0021(c), (d), (h) (2021); see also 513 IND. ADMIN. CODE
1-2-4(b) (2020); IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-2-11(a)(1)(A), (B) (2018) (including in the definition
of physical restraint contact between a student and an SRO and restricting the use of
physical restraint). But see TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 37.0021(g), (h) (2021) (failing to require
law enforcement officers to comply with laws regarding school corporal punishment).
432. See 513 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-2-4(b) (2020); 513 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-2-11(a)(5)(B)
(2018).
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Regarding reporting, Indiana and Kansas require timely reporting of every incident of restraint or seclusion, including those involving
an SRO, to the student’s parent.433 Kentucky requires reporting to
the state department of education and local law enforcement when
physical restraint or seclusion results in death, substantial risk of
death, extreme physical pain, obvious disfigurement, or impairment
of a bodily organ.434 Kentucky also requires the collection of data
regarding the number of instances in which an SRO “or other sworn
law enforcement officer is involved in the physical restraint or
seclusion of a student.”435
Pennsylvania and California require SROs and school security
guards to receive training before working on school campuses.436 Such
training is consistent with the recommendation by the National Association of School Resource Officers to train every SRO for at least
forty hours on topics including building positive relationships with
students and staff.437
California also prohibits local educational agencies from authorizing, consenting to, or paying for interventions that are designed
to or likely to cause physical pain or subject an individual to verbal
abuse, ridicule, or humiliation, “or that can be expected to cause excessive emotional trauma.”438 This California law suggests that security guards and law enforcement officers that work for a California
school district would not be permitted to brutalize schoolchildren.
In contrast, many other states’ laws increase the likelihood of
school brutality by law enforcement officers.439 Numerous states’ laws
explicitly establish that regulations of seclusion, restraint, or corporal
punishment do not apply to the actions of law enforcement officers
in schools.440 For instance, a North Carolina statute states, “Nothing
433. See 513 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-2-7(c) (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-6154(b) (2016).
434. 704 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 7:160(1)(13), 7:160(2)(1)(e) (2019).
435. 704 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 7:160(7) (2019).
436. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 38001.5(a) (2020); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1313-C(a.1),
1314-C(b) (2019).
437. NAT’L ASS’N SCH. RES. OFFICERS, Training Courses, https://www.nasro.org/train
ing/training-courses [https://perma.cc/5N73-RMB2] (last visited Apr. 7, 2022).
438. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 56521.2(a)(1), (4) (2013).
439. See Ryan King & Marc Schindler, A Better Path Forward for Criminal Justice:
Reconsidering Police in Schools, BROOKINGS (Apr. 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/re
search/a-better-path-forward-for-criminal-justice-reconsidering-police-in-schools
[https://perma.cc/TEE5-KDRX].
440. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-105(E) (2015) (authorizing SROs to respond
without using the reporting and review protocol if facing a case of imminent danger);
ARK. CODE. ANN. § 6-10-128(a) (2021) (permitting law enforcement to “assist with school
security, safety, emergency preparedness, emergency response, or any other responsibility
assigned to the [SRO] by the school or law enforcement agency”); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 10-236b(q), 46a-152(g) (2018); 14 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 610(9.4) (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN.
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in this subsection [regulating physical restraint] shall be construed
to prevent the use of force by law enforcement officers . . . .”441
Vermont statutory law goes even farther by prohibiting government
agencies from regulating, such as through promulgation of administrative regulations, the use of restraint and seclusion on school
property by SROs.442
A few states that allow corporal punishment in schools have used
the law to expand policing at schools.443 Missouri empowers school
districts to appoint school administrators and teachers as school
protection officers, who are permitted to carry a firearm on campus
and have “the same authority to detain or use force against any person on school property” as any other law enforcement officer.444 Other
states, such as Mississippi, require police officers in schools to get
deeply involved in school discipline by requiring them to be “subjected to the duties of a constable for the purposes of preventing all
violations of law on school property . . . and for preserving order and
decorum.”445 Florida requires that every school in the state have at
least one SRO who is required to make arrests for law violations on
school campuses.446
In the wake of George Floyd’s murder, thirty-three school districts
removed SROs from their campuses by ending contracts with police
§ 72-6153(i)(1)–(2) (2016) (exempting SROs from regulations of school seclusion and
restraint, but requiring school security officers to comply with such regulations); 704 KY.
ADMIN. REGS. 7:160 (2019) (permitting “the lawful exercise of law enforcement duties by
sworn law enforcement officers”); 05-071-33 CODE ME. R. § 6(5) (2013) (exempting law
enforcement officers from being subject to regulations on restraint); MD. CODE REGS.
13A.08.04.03(C)(2) (permitting law enforcement personnel to “exercise[] their responsibilities, including the physical detainment of a student . . . alleged to have committed a
crime”); 603 MASS. CODE REGS. 46.04(4)(b) (applying also to school security personnel);
7-38 MISS. CODE R. § 38.13(5)(g) (2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-391.1(c)(4), (d)(3), (e)(4)
(2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-5-4.12(G) (2017); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.0021(g)(1)
(2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53G-8-302(6) (2019) (exempting law enforcement officers from
the ban on corporal punishment); cf. COLO. REV. STAT. § 26-20-102(1)(b)(II) (2021) (excluding law enforcement agencies from the meaning of “agencies,” which have to comply with
the regulations). As mentioned previously, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi,
North Carolina, and Utah also permit the use of handcuffs as a mechanical restraint by
law enforcement officers. KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 91-42-2(g)(6) (2017); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:416.21(A)(2)(b)(ii) (2017); 05-071 ME. CODE R. § 6(5) (2021); 7 MISS. CODE R.
§ 38.13(4)(d) (2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391.1(b)(7) (2011); UTAH ADMIN. CODE R.
277-609-4(3)(l)(v)(C) (LexisNexis 2016).
441. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391.1(c)(4) (2011).
442. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1167(a) (2014).
443. See, e.g., Jess Clark, Where Corporal Punishment Is Still Used in School, Its Roots
Run Deep, NPR (Apr. 12, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/04/12
/521944429/where-corporal-punishment-is-still-used-its-roots-go-deep [https://perma.cc
/6Y34-V3AJ].
444. MO. REV. STAT. § 160.665(3) (2014).
445. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-7-323 (2006) (emphasis added).
446. FL. STAT. § 1006.12(2)(b) (2019).
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departments, and others changed their relationships with security personnel.447 Some of the removals are also a response to years of organizing by youth of color to remove police from schools.448 An example is
in Madison, Wisconsin, where four restorative justice coordinators
replaced four SROs.449 The coordinators train educators on restorative justice approaches, which emphasize resolving interpersonal
conflicts and repairing relationships.450 The Madison teachers’ union
advocated for more school counselors and social workers in schools.451
Other districts are using the money saved by removing SROs to hire
social workers and implement restorative justice practices.452
F. How School Systems Are Closed to Public Scrutiny and the
Need for New Private Rights of Action
Investigations in multiple states show that states brutalize
students in violation of their own laws, and schools tend to hide and
make light of illegal incidents of school brutality.453 Such investigations refute Ingraham’s assumptions that corporal punishment is
rarely severe at schools, schools are “open” to public scrutiny, and
common-law safeguards adequately protect children from excessive
corporal punishment at school.454 Given the lack of meaningful
governmental oversight of incidents of brutality and lack of enforcement of the law by state officials, parents and children need either
new private rights of action or fewer barriers to access justice through
tort and criminal law actions.
Many schools corporally punish children in violation of state
law.455 For instance, “[a]bout a dozen school districts in states where
corporal punishment is banned reported using it on students more
than 300 times during the 2017–18 school year.”456 Louisiana, which
prohibits paddling students with disabilities, reported hitting special education students nearly 100 times in 2017–18.457 A video of a
principal paddling a six-year-old girl in a Florida county that banned
corporal punishment sparked outrage in early 2021.458 Officials at
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.

See Schwartz et al., supra note 170.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Keierleber, supra note 19.
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 689 (1977).
Keierleber, supra note 19.
Id.
Id.
Mark Keierleber, ‘It’s barbaric’: some US children getting hit at school despite
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state departments of education have indicated that school districts
are supposed to investigate instances of improper corporal punishment
and correct them, but sometimes the only punishment for teachers
who violate corporal punishment bans is a letter of reprimand.459
Investigations also reveal school seclusion and restraint in violation of state law.460 To illustrate, since 1993, Illinois law has prohibited “slapping, paddling or prolonged maintenance of students in
physically painful positions.”461 Illinois law only permits the use of
seclusion when students pose a safety threat to themselves or others;
seclusion can never be used as a form of discipline or punishment.462
Physical restraint is only permitted when the student’s behavior
presents “an imminent danger of serious physical harm to the student or others and less restrictive and intrusive measures have been
tried and proven ineffective in stopping the imminent danger of
serious physical harm.”463
Nevertheless, in 2013–14, Illinois had more incidents of seclusion than any other state.464 An investigation into 20,000 seclusion
incidents in 2017–18 by ProPublica Illinois and the Chicago Tribune
demonstrated that Illinois school officials secluded children for
“refusing to do classwork, for swearing, for spilling milk, for throwing
Legos.”465 Teachers, social workers, and security personnel secluded
children for convenience, out of frustration, or as punishment, sometimes referring to seclusion as “serving time.”466 Investigators found
that in more than a third of 12,000 documented incidents of seclusion,
school workers documented no safety reason for the seclusion.467 State
education officials were unaware of the repeated violations because
they did not monitor schools’ use of seclusion; state law requires
schools to file a detailed report about each use of seclusion, but no
one is required to read the reports.468 Parents were often told little
about what happened to their children.469
Similarly, a ProPublica “analysis of more than 15,000 physical
restraints in 100 Illinois school districts from August 2017 to early
bans, GUARDIAN (May 19, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/education/2021
/may/19/us-children-corporal-punishment-schools [https://perma.cc/A4VX-VJMB].
459. See, e.g., Keierleber, supra note 19.
460. Id.
461. See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-24 (1995).
462. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 1.285 (2021).
463. Id.
464. Richards et al., supra note 85.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. See id.
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December 2018 found that about a quarter of the interventions began
without any documented safety reason.”470 “Instead, [physical restraints] often happened after a student was disrespectful, profane,
or not following rules.”471 For instance, a girl in the Chicago suburbs
reported being “smashed to the floor” during a thirty-two minute
restraint that began when she refused to return to a seclusion room
after a bathroom break.472 “[S]chool workers waited for her to stop
moving.”473
As a result of the 15,000 physical restraints in Illinois, children
suffered cuts on their hands; scratches on necks and noses; sore collarbones; knots on their heads; split lips; and sore ankles and wrists.474
“In at least [twenty-four] incidents, schools called for an ambulance for a child.”475 School employees also were injured while children
“sometimes bit, hit, or kicked while trying to get free.”476 The study
found that schools across Illinois were using prone restraints, which
are “particularly dangerous because they can cut off a child’s ability
to breathe.”477 Especially disturbing is the likelihood that without
ProPublica’s analysis of the reports on restraints, the illegal school
brutality upon Illinois children would have remained hidden.
Similarly, in Washington, D.C., regulations prohibit the corporal
punishment of children, including shoving, hitting, and “unreasonable
restraint.”478 A Disability Rights DC investigation of a 2016 restraint
revealed that D.C. Public Schools’ (DCPS) staff punched and pulled
the hair and ripped the clothing of a seventeen-year-old child during
a restraint.479 The punch, hair pulling, and ripped clothing were not
reported in a school incident report, and a DCPS investigation in
response to a complaint concluded that no action was warranted.480
In other words, DCPS failed to adequately report the level of physical
violence during the restraint and failed to take any accountability
470. Richards et al., supra note 85.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. Richards et al., supra note 85.
477. Id.
478. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5-E, § 2403.3 (2002) (prohibiting corporal punishment, defined
as “the use, or attempted use, of physical force upon, or against, a student, either intentionally or with reckless disregard for the student’s safety, as a punishment, or discipline”
and prohibiting “unreasonable restraint”).
479. DISABILITY RTS. D.C., supra note 86 (describing how staff at a Washington, D.C.
public school failed to describe the restraint in incident reports and no legal recourse
occurred).
480. Id. at 3.
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for such violence.481 The fact that D.C. law did not prohibit restraint
or seclusion at public schools did not help the child.482
Disability Rights DC also found that in the winter of 2019, a D.C.
public charter school staff member, who had never received training
on seclusion, secluded a six-year-old child on multiple occasions
without documenting, reporting, or informing the child’s parents of
the seclusions.483 The child began “experiencing recurring nightmares as a result of [the] seclusions.”484
In Oregon, “an investigation by Oregon Public Broadcasting found
several parents in Vancouver Public Schools . . . who [said that] school
officials rarely notified them when their children had been restrained,”
demonstrating that even when state law requires that schools report
restraint or seclusion to parents, such reports do not always occur.485
The investigations of school brutality in Illinois, the District of
Columbia, and Oregon demonstrate how existing prohibitions on
school brutality are not fully effective, and schools are not “open” for
supervision by the community, as the U.S. Supreme Court assumed
in Ingraham v. Wright.486 School systems are not good at regulating
or revealing their own use of violence against children. These systems
are not inclined to accurately report illegal incidents to themselves
or parents or to stop violations on their own.487 School systems have
yet to demonstrate that they can meaningfully review incidents of
school brutality and act to decrease such incidents.488 Further, prosecutors are also often reluctant to bring charges against educators.489
Thus, community supervision is relegated to parents, who will
not get the information that they need to exercise their Fourteenth
481. See id. at 4, 9.
482. See id. at 3.
483. DISABILITY RTS. DC, The Need for Oversight and Restriction of the Seclusion and
Restraint of District Youth Attending DC Public Schools 4–5 (Oct. 2019), http://www.uls
-dc.org/media/1185/2019-seclusion-restraint-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HES-KJQD].
484. Id. at 4.
485. See Abamu & Manning, supra note 16 (explaining how the mother of a child with
autism in Vancouver, Oregon, complained in a lawsuit that her son’s school did not tell
her about all the restraints that were performed on her son).
486. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670 (1977) (“As long as the schools are open to public
scrutiny, there is no reason to believe that the common-law constraints will not effectively remedy and deter excesses [in school corporal punishment]”).
487. See DISABILITY RTS. D.C., supra note 86, at 7–8.
488. See id.
489. See, e.g., Lateshia Beachum, Florida principal caught on video paddling 6-yearold student won’t face criminal charges, state attorney’s office says, WASH. POST (May 9,
2021, 2:46 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/05/09/florida-principal-pad
dled-no-charges [https://perma.cc/CXT2-Q4JN] (reporting that prosecutors decided not
to bring criminal charges against a school principal who violated a county prohibition on
school corporal punishment in part because there was “ ‘no evidence or indication of great
bodily harm, permanent harm or permanent disfigurement’ to the child”).
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Amendment right to procedural due process unless laws are enforced
to ensure accurate and complete reporting of school brutality incidents.490 In addition, parents cannot exercise their constitutional
procedural due process rights when teachers are overly protected by
statutes that indemnify them for physically harming students.491
Unless immunity for teachers is reduced when they corporally punish
children, parents need new private rights of action with which to
protect their children.
III. SOLUTIONS
This Article described numerous legal structures that legalize or
facilitate school brutality, including the continued influence of the
colonial teacher tort privilege;492 Ingraham’s erroneous assumptions
about the openness of schools, community supervision of schools, and
the adequacy of state civil and criminal proceedings and remedies;493
limited rights for children at school under the U.S. Constitution’s
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments;494 ambiguous state
statutes that permit school corporal punishment, seclusion, and/or
restraint practices;495 independent regulation of each practice;496
qualified immunity and statutory indemnity for school corporal punishment;497 exclusions of school corporal punishment from state
definitions of child abuse;498 statutory expansions of police powers
in schools;499 federal funding for the regular presence of police in
schools;500 inaccurate and incomplete reporting of school brutality
incidents;501 and lack of meaningful review of incident reports.502
To protect children from school brutality, then, multiple legal
structures and resources must be reformed. To begin with, legislators
and judges must eliminate the tort privilege that enables principals
to hit children in schools, given that the in loco parentis doctrine is
490. See, e.g., supra note 484 and accompanying text (giving the example of one teacher
using seclusion on a six-year-old without documenting or reporting its use, nor notifying
the parents).
491. See supra Section II.C.2.
492. See supra Section II.A.
493. See id.
494. See supra Section II.B.
495. See supra Section II.C.2.
496. See id.
497. See id.
498. See id.
499. See supra Section II.E.
500. See id.
501. See supra Section II.F.
502. See id.
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inconsistent with compulsory school attendance laws and the privilege is unreasonable in light of research on the effects of corporal
punishment and trauma.503 Legislators and judges should also extend
tort protections against battery, assault, and false imprisonment to
children at schools. Statutes that indemnify school personnel and
police officers from civil and criminal liability for school brutality must
be replaced with statutes indicating that such brutality creates civil
and criminal liability. Unless governmental officials become less
shielded from civil and criminal liability, new private rights of action
must be provided to parents and children so that they can exercise
their Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights.504
Assault and false imprisonment of children at school should be
crimes, to the same extent that they are for adults. Legal definitions
of child abuse should include the excessive use of physical force by
governmental employees in public schools, and the standards regarding child abuse in foster homes should apply to school settings.
All states should stop separating the regulation of seclusion and
restraint from the regulation of corporal punishment, or at least ensure that regulations are consistent across all three practices.
Moreover, all states or the federal legislature should ban the use of
any form of physical force by any adult government employee or
contractor in public schools with the exception of allowing restraint
when a child’s behavior poses an imminent risk of serious physical
harm upon themselves or others.
State and federal legislators should prevent police officers from
having a regular presence in public schools and prevent them from
participating in school discipline.505 State and federal legislators
should restrict the use of force by law enforcement officers and
security guards in schools. Instead of funding the placement of
police officers in schools, funds should be directed at placing counselors in schools and training educators and school security guards
about school climate and behavior-management strategies that do
not use physical force.506 Nonpunitive approaches to addressing
problematic behaviors, including restorative justice, positive behavioral interventions and strategies, and trauma-responsive approaches,
should be emphasized. School safety should be addressed as a public
503. See supra Section II.A.
504. See supra Section II.B.
505. DIGNITY IN SCH., supra note 105 (explaining that parents, students, and over 100
other organizations from across the country have called for the end of the regular
presence of law enforcement in schools); Dolan, Scheuer & Nagarajan-Swenson, supra
note 194, at 19 (calling for the end of the regular presence of law enforcement in schools).
506. DIGNITY IN SCH., supra note 105, at 2; Dolan, Scheuer & Nagarajan-Swenson,
supra note 194, at 5.
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health issue, rather than an issue to be addressed through law enforcement and surveillance.507 Specifically, schools should promote
safety through promoting healthy relationships between adults and
children at schools, supporting students’ sense of belonging and safety
at school, and the provision of adequate, trauma-informed mental
health supports.
Moreover, local and state educational agencies, legislators, and
the public must support educators, security guards, and police officers
as they make the cultural shift from traditional approaches to discipline to trauma-informed and evidence-based approaches to modifying such behavior. Such support should involve collaborating with
and listening to educators and safety officers to identify barriers to
change and providing resources to overcome such barriers. Barriers
to change are likely to include the effects of childhood and adult
trauma upon educators and safety officers themselves;508 implicit
and explicit biases that cause adults to fear or devalue certain
children or groups of children;509 a lack of understanding regarding
behavioral and other disabilities;510 a lack of skills and practice regarding alternative approaches to addressing problematic behaviors;511
feelings of overwhelm and isolation in the classroom or school when
children misbehave;512 and inadequate resources in the classroom
and school.513 When asking educators to become trauma-responsive,
school systems should also become trauma-responsive to educators,
including by providing in-school mental health and professional
development support to educators.
At the same time, federal, state, and local prosecutors should be
given more resources to uncover and charge state employees for
507. See KRISTIN HENNING, THE RAGE OF INNOCENCE 313 (2021).
508. Lombardo & Abamu, supra note 40 (including one teacher saying they “would
lock [them]self in the bathroom at work and cry, and I know that I wasn’t the only one,”
when facing using restraint or seclusion on students).
509. See Wesley Wright, Fear of black students, unfair treatment rampant in Denver
schools, black educators say, CHALKBEAT (Aug. 5, 2016, 11:09 AM), https://co.chalkbeat
.org/2016/8/5/21106311/fear-of-black-students-unfair-treatment-rampant-in-denver
-schools-black-educators-say [https://perma.cc/JP2K-ASRG] (describing how some educa
tors feared Black students); Sharon R. Bailey, An Examination of Student and Educator
Experiences in Denver Public Schools Through the Voices of African-American Teachers
and Administrators 10–11 (2016), https://celt.dpsk12.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/52/Dr
.-Bailey-Report-FULL-2.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3uQ7HAxcZWPM3Q7ZkRXXwP1s6tQ5GtSS
vERB_oTkRNSYR9K2yCuHvWfjs [https://perma.cc/PKW8-4T8A]; HENNING, supra note
507, at 303 (“[W]e must act now to repair the harms of racial trauma and create new
opportunities for Black youth to succeed in the face of demonizing stereotypes that cause
others to fear and devalue them”).
510. See supra Section I.B.
511. See id.
512. See id.
513. See id.
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committing school brutality, and the U.S. Department of Education
should continue educating school leaders on the traumatizing effects
of school brutality and better methods to address misbehavior.
Given the slow, piecemeal reform of state laws regarding corporal punishment, seclusion, and restraint and uncertainty regarding
when and how the U.S. Supreme Court might rule on another school
corporal punishment case, the most efficient and effective first step
for reducing school brutality would be federal legislation to end school
corporal punishment, seclusion, and almost all forms of restraint;
end qualified immunity or at least immunity for school brutality;
eliminate the regular presence of police at schools; and provide educators with training and resources to change their disciplinary practices. A few federal bills are poised to achieve many of these goals.514
The George Floyd Justice in Policing Act (H.R. 1280), for instance,
which was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in March
2021, would eliminate federal qualified immunity for local law enforcement officers.515 This bill, as well as state legislation to end
qualified and specific statutory immunity for school personnel and
law enforcement officers regarding use of force in schools, would
significantly improve the ability of parents and children to vindicate
their rights in school brutality cases.516
The Counseling Not Criminalization in Schools Act (H.R. 4011
and S. 2125) would direct $2.5 billion in federal grants away from
supporting the presence of police in schools and toward evidencebased and trauma-informed services and personnel, including social
workers and counselors.517
The act would support decisions by local educational agencies
to dissolve or disband district-based police departments or end contracts with local law enforcement agencies.518 Specifically, the act
would prohibit the appropriation of federal funds for hiring, maintaining, and training SROs and law enforcement officers who are
employed, contracted, or assigned to work at a public elementary or
secondary school.519 The act would provide grants to replace such
514. See, e.g., Gomez, infra note 515.
515. Henry J. Gomez, Here’s what the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act would do,
NBC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2021, 1:13 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/here-s
-what-george-floyd-justice-policing-act-would-do-n1264825 [https://perma.cc/P53D-FRV2];
H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. § 102 (2021).
516. See id.
517. Cayla Bamberger, Sen. Chris Murphy, others reintroduce legislation to increase
counselors in schools, CTPOST (June 17, 2021, 11:15 AM), https://www.ctpost.com/news/ar
ticle/Sen-Chris-Murphy-others-reintroduce-legislation-16254885.php [https://perma.cc
/A7YY-YUX8]; S. 2125, 117th Cong. §§ 5(a), 6(a)(1), 6(d)(1) (2021).
518. S. 2125, 117th Cong. §§ 3(2), 5(a), 6(1) (2021); S. 2125, 117th Cong. § 3(2) (2021).
519. Id. at § 5(a).

2022]

ENDING SCHOOL BRUTALITY

683

law enforcement officers with services and personnel, such as social
workers, psychologists, counselors, community health workers, and
trauma-informed personnel, that support mental health and traumainformed services.520
Protecting Our Students in Schools Act (POSSA) (H.R. 3836 and
S. 2029) and the Keeping All Students Safe Act (KASSA) (H.R. 3471
and S. 1858) would significantly reduce school brutality in public
schools. POSSA defines corporal punishment as “a deliberate act
which causes the student to feel physical pain for the purpose of
discipline, including an act of physical force.”521 POSSA prohibits the
corporal punishment of any student “by [school] program personnel,
a law enforcement officer, or school security guards under any program which receives Federal financial assistance.”522 It provides a
private right of action to students and parents of students who have
experienced corporal punishment.523 Students or parents can file a
civil action in federal or state court for “attorneys’ fees, expert fees,
injunctive relief, and compensatory damages.”524 POSSA also authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to initiate a civil action against state
agents who violate the law after receiving a complaint in writing
signed by a parent.525 Further, POSSA authorizes the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights to enforce the law by withholding federal payments to educational programs that violate the
law.526 POSSA provides grants to “[s]tate educational agencies to
improve school climate and culture by implementing positive behavioral interventions and supports” and other non-exclusionary and
aversive discipline practices.527
KASSA prohibits the seclusion or restraint of any student by a
law enforcement officer, school security guard, or any school staff in
any program receiving federal financial assistance.528 The only
exception to the prohibition is restraint when the “student’s behavior poses an imminent danger of serious physical injury to the
student . . . or another individual” and “less restrictive interventions
520. Id. at § 6(d)(1).
521. Protecting Our Students in Schools Act of 2021, S. 2029, 117th Cong. § 3(1) (2021)
(providing examples of acts of physical force, including “striking, spanking, or paddling,
inflicted on a student’s body, requiring a student to assume a painful physical position,
or the use of chemical sprays, electroshock weapon, or stun guns on a student’s body.”).
522. Id. at § 101(a).
523. See id. at § 101(b).
524. See id.
525. Id. at § 102.
526. Id. at § 103(c)(1).
527. S. 2029, 117th Cong. § 202(a) (2021).
528. S. 1858, 117th Cong. § 101(a) (2021).
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would be ineffective in stopping such imminent danger.”529 KASSA
also provides a private right of action to any “student who has been
subjected to unlawful seclusion or restraint . . . or the parent of such
student.”530 The action would be civil and it could be brought against
the program, but not any individual school staff person, under which
the violation is alleged to occur.531 The listed possible remedies include compensatory relief, declaratory judgment, injunctive relief,
attorneys’ fees, and expert fees.532 KASSA also requires immediate
notification about a restraint to a student’s parent.533 Passage of
KASSA, POSSA, The Counseling Not Criminalization in Schools Act,
and The George Floyd Justice in Policing Act would help to save
lives and promote educational achievement.
The enactment of any or all of the above federal bills, however,
should be accompanied by an infusion of resources into public schools
to support educators in transitioning from traditional methods of discipline to non-physical, evidence-based approaches. Such resources
should address the barriers to change mentioned above and should
include training; in-school trauma-responsive mental health support
for adults, including counseling; training to address implicit and
explicit bias and lack of knowledge about childhood disabilities; and
other resources to address educators’ feelings of being overwhelmed
and isolated in the classroom. While the provision of these resources
will cost money, the resources are necessary to ensure an effective
transition to school environments that more effectively improve
behaviors, create a sense of safety for both children and adults,
reduce child and adult injuries, improve educator satisfaction, and,
ultimately, reduce costs for public schools.534
CONCLUSION
Americans have become desensitized to the trauma that public
schools inflict upon children, but the brutality endured by hundreds
of thousands of children each year requires urgent attention. It is
time for the nation to end its hidden, colonial habit of brutalizing
children in school and thinking that such brutality is reasonable.
529. Id. at § 101(e)(1)(A)–(D) (providing additional requirements regarding training
of the person administering the restraint, as well as the duration and method of the
restraint).
530. Id. at § 101(c)(1).
531. Id. at § 101(c)(1)–(2).
532. Id. at § 101(c)(1).
533. Id. at § 101(e)(4)(A)(i).
534. See, e.g., Abamu & Manning, supra note 16; Richards & Cohen, supra note 141.
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Non-abusive alternatives exist, and new understandings of how corporal punishment causes trauma; worsens behavior and academic
achievement; and disproportionately harms Black children and children with disabilities make the habit unacceptable and shameful.535
The speed with which states have recently begun regulating seclusion and restraint, and the desire to end excessive state applications
of force in response to George Floyd’s death have provided momentum
to make public systems better. The public, legislators, and judges
can save lives and improve educational achievement by eliminating
school brutality. Will we continue to allow the government to continue violating children’s physical safety at public schools? Or will
we do what is necessary to end child abuse by adults at schools?

535. See supra Part I.

